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For 
Against 
4,393 
5,121 
Total 9,514 
The total vote for representatives in Congress on the same 
day was 10,205. I t thus appears that the vote on this amend-
ment was much nearer the vote cast for public officers on 
the same day than is usual in the case of votes on constitu-
tional amendments. 
This is the last word up to date of the people of Rhode 
Island to the members of the General Assembly as to whether 
the General Assembly shall have the right to call a constitu-
tional convention. The people, when the question was square-
ly presented to them, refused to give the members of the 
General Assembly such a right. 
This appears to us to be at least as important in its bear-
ings as the Opinion of the Justices in 1883. 
Of course, it may be argued with some ingenuity on the 
other side that "the reason why the people rejected the pro-
posed amendment was because they considered the General 
Assembly already had the power to call a convention, or that 
they disliked the provision requiring a three-fifths approval 
of the action of such a convention"; but those are arguments 
a little too fine to have been likely to appeal to the ordinary 
body of the electors. The latter are not as a rule interested 
in refinements, but act in view of a general position or propo-
sition which is readily understandable by people of normal 
intelligence; and when they voted by a majority to reject a 
constitutional amendment, empowering the Assembly to call 
a convention as a means to amending the Constitution, it is 
fair to conclude that they meant what they said, and that 
whatever might be the rule elsewhere they did not wish that 
mode of amendment to be open under our Constitution at 
least. There is the people's own reply to the question before 
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this Court. A reply which, we submit, has in substance the 
same effect as though the negative of this question were ac-
tually written into the Constitution itself. To that effect is 
Bennett vs. Jackson, 186 Ind. 533 (1917), where a majority 
of four out of five Judges gave great weight to the fact that 
the people had previously rejected a proposal to call a con-
stitutional convention, and held that the legislature should 
not disregard that latest expression of the people, but that 
such expression of the will of the people should be deemed 
as binding on the General Assembly as a- positive provision 
of the Constitution. 
2. In 1898 and 1899 constitutional amendments to 
authorize the legislature to submit to the people the ques-
tion whether conventions should be called were rejected. 
Subsequent historic factors. 
The question as to whether the Rhode Island Assembly has 
a constitutional right to submit to the people the question 
whether a constitutional convention should be called is not 
before the Court at this time, since the precise question sub-
mitted is whether the legislature has power to "provide by 
law (a) for a convention to be called to revise or amend the 
Constitution of the State," i. e., the question contemplates 
the possibility of the convention being provided for by law, 
passed by the General Assembly, and does not ask whether 
the Assembly can or should first take the instructions of the 
people. 
We shall deal with this question a little more at length 
hereafter, but for the moment it is important only to observe 
that the General Assembly, having proposed and approved a 
form of entirely new and revised Constitutions, in the mode 
provided by Article XI I I , twice submitted the same to the 
people (in 1898 and 1899), each of which carried an express 
provision that "At the general election to be held in the year 
1906 and each twentieth year thereafter, the General Assem-
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bly shall by law provide that the question, 'Shall there be a 
convention to revise the Constitution', be decided by the 
electors." And in both instances the people rejected the Con-
stitution which contained this provision. 
This is the last word to date of the people of Rhode Island 
to the members of the General Assembly as to whether the 
latter shall even have the right to submit to the people the 
question, "Shall there be a convention to revise the Consti-
tution?" The people, when this question was so presented to 
them, refused to give the members of the General Assembly 
such a right. 
In view of the foregoing, we submit that the Opinion of 
the Justices has been supported by the direct and definite 
vote of the people as to the meaning which they wish to be 
given to their fundamental law. 
That Judge Durfee was correct in his statement that the 
existing mode of amendment is entirely practicable, appears 
clearly enough from the simple fact that under the provi-
sions of Article X I I I twenty-one amendments have been pro-
posed and adopted, ranging over the period beginning No-
vember, 1854, and terminating with the last amendment on 
November 4, 1930 (absentee voting). In addition, a consid-
erable number of other amendments have been proposed, in 
each case pursuant to the mode specified in the Constitution, 
and have been rejected, especially those above referred to in 
1883, 1898 and 1899. 
At the January session of 1924, His Honor the present 
Lieutenant Governor, introduced a resolution relative to 
calling and holding a constitutional convention. Section 1 of 
which was as follows: 
"Section 1. For the purpose of ascertaining the will 
of the people of the State with reference to the calling 
and holding of a Constitutional Convention, the Gover-
nor shall and is hereby directed to call by public pro-
clamation a special election to be holden on the Second 
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Tuesday in August, A. D. 1924, to determine the fol-
lowing question: 
" 'Shall there be a Convention to revise, alter or 
amend the Constitution of the State?' 
"Also to elect delegates to said Convention." 
The resolution failed of passage, but it will be observed 
that even this resolution, introduced by one who will not be 
accused of being ultra-conservative, provided not for the 
calling of a constitutional convention by the Assembly, but 
for the submission to the people of the question as to whether 
or not such a convention should be called. 
So that we revert to our previous statement that for nine-
ty-two years—the entire period following the adoption of our 
Constitution—it has always been generally accepted that the 
Assembly has no constitutional power to call a constitutional 
convention, and furthermore that, so fa r as we are able to 
ascertain, not once has a resolution even been introduced 
into the General Assembly providing for the calling by it of 
such a convention. 
True, there is evidence that it has been considered on two 
occasions that the General Assembly had power to submit 
to the people the question whether such a convention should 
be called, but even this subordinate power was denied by our 
Supreme Court in 1883. and notwithstanding the activity 
and agitation of such sterling Democrats as the late Charles 
E. Gorman, Augustus S. Miller, David S. Baker, Hugh J . 
Carroll, James H. Higgins, John J . Fitzgerald, Lucius C. 
Garvin, and many others, it appears to have been accepted, 
until the Lieutenant Governor's action in 1924, that if the 
Constitution was to be amended it must be by compliance 
with Article X I I I and not even by submitting to the people 
the question whether such a convention should be called. 
There is, therefore, a sharp distinction between the period 
before and af ter the adoption of the present instrument. 
393 
Prior thereto, frequent agitation and several conventions re-
sulting in adoption. Subsequent thereto, although at periods 
much discussion, no conventions, no call for a convention, 
and a distinct opinion by an able Supreme Court that none 
could be called, a position acquiesced in for over fifty years— 
and all fortified by an express and distinct rejection by the 
people of a proposal to put into their Constitution an amend-
ment which would give the General Assembly the power here 
in question. 
Surely, from the point of view of history, the matter should 
no longer be considered open. There ought to be some point 
at which matters of this kind may fairly be considered deter-
mined. If, contrary to our contention, this Court should an-
swer these questions "Yes", let there be no mistake—the 
matter would not be settled, and could not be, in that way. 
If this Court, in an advisory opinion, can properly disregard 
a similar opinion fifty years ago, it furnishes a cogent and 
additional reason why another Court, ten, twenty-five or fifty 
years hence may consider the matter still open and again de-
cide in accordance with the original holding, leading to fur-
ther confusion upon one of the fundamental principles of our 
government. But it may be answered that if the answer is 
"Yes" a constitutional convention may be held and a new 
Constitution adopted which will specifically cover the matter 
and set it at rest. We submit that this cannot by any means 
be taken as certain. There is certainly substantial doubt, if 
a convention should be held and a Constitution framed, 
whether it would be approved. Based on our history in 1898 
and 1899, there is much reason to anticipate rejection, in 
which event the matter would be and remain wide open. On 
the other hand, if the Court should agree with the views here-
in expressed, and should answer the question in the nega-
tive, that point of constitutional law at least would be set-
tled for all time, leaving it open, as before, for the submission 
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to the people in the constitutional mode under Article X I I I 
as to whether the General Assembly should be authorized to 
provide for the calling of conventions, or, to provide in the 
alternative, for submission to the people of the question 
whether such a convention should from time to time be held. 
True, a period of time (approximately two years) must 
elapse before adoption or rejection, but that is a short time 
in the history of a State, and will be more than compensated 
by certainty as to the meaning of our supreme law. 
D. Consideration of Opinion of the Justices, 
6 Cush. (Mass.) 573 
And while we are on that point, it may not be amiss to 
dispose of one argument often advanced in support of the 
opposing view—it is said that the constitutional mode (Arti-
cle X I I I ) should not be exclusive, as the convention mode 
should be open in case of great crisis or emergency where 
hasty action may be vital to the Republic. We leave those 
cases on one side, as was done by the Supreme Court of Mas-
sachusetts, Opinion of the Justices, 6 Cush. 573. That case 
carries an intimation that in the event of a real crisis, means 
would be found to meet it even though that means were in 
theory revolutionary. In the present instance, however, we 
have no such circumstance. Something in the nature of a 
crisis there is, but it is economic and not political, and so 
far as we are aware, no one claims that any contemplated 
changes in the Constitution can do more to improve that 
condition than can be or is being done under the present 
form of our government. We are threatened by no alien foe, 
and the only crises which are referred to by opponents in 
previous pronouncements are the alleged need of changes in 
the franchise, of the apportionment of the Senate, the redis-
r i c t i ng of the State, the tenure or constitution of the judici-
ary, and similar matters. If the existence of "crises" of this 
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nature is determinative, then we have been in a crisis since 
1783, which leads to the question "How long can a crisis con-
tinue without resolving itself into a normal state of affairs?" 
The Rhode Island Court considers the Massachusetts case 
analogous. Let us examine it a little more closely. From it it 
appears (page 571) that if the people were considered to have 
a natural right in emergencies or upon the obvious failure of 
the existing Constitution to accomplish its objects, to provide 
for amendment or alteration, that view, 
"would involve the general question of natural rights 
and the inherent and fundamental principles upon 
which civil society is founded, rather than any question 
upon the nature, construction or operation of the ex-
isting Constitution of the Commonwealth and the laics 
made under it" 
That is precisely the view of our Supreme Court, to which 
we fully subscribe. To us it means this: That if we are go-
ing upon theories of natural right or rights alleged to be re-
served, those by definition are not constitutional rights, that 
therefore such rights, if they exist at all, are rights of revolu-
tion and not of constitutional procedure. 
The Massachusetts Court continues, stating its presump-
tion "That the opinion requested applies to the existing Con-
stitution and laws of the Commonwealth and the rights and 
powers derived from and under them." So here. This Court 
is asked with respect to "What would be a valid exercise of 
the legislative power." As it is conceded that the Assembly 
has no rights except under the Constitution, then the exercise 
of its powers must be pursuant to that instrument and not 
upon some theory of inherent right apart from the Constitu-
tion. And we may as well say here, with Judge Durfee in 
his monograph, that since under Article IV, Section 1, "This 
Constitution shall be the supreme law of the State," we abso-
lutely deny the existence of any law, whether it be called 
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reserved power, natural right, or "common law right," over 
and above the Constitution. If there is another law superior 
to it, then the Constitution is not the supreme law of the 
State. The two ideas are mutually exclusive. As Judge Dur-
fee said, 
"If there be any such law, for there is no record of 
i t 01* of any legislation or custom in this State recog-
nizing it, then it is, in our opinion, rather a law, if law 
it can be called, of revolutionary than of constitutional 
change." 
The Massachusetts Court thereupon determines that 
"Under and pursuant to the existing Constitution, 
there is no authority given by any reasonable construc-
tion or necessary implication by which any specific and 
particular amendment or amendments of the Constitu-
tion can be made in any other manner than that pre-
scribed in the Ninth Article of the amendments adopted 
in 1820. Considering that previous to 1820 no mode 
was provided by the Constitution for its own amend-
ment, that no other power for that purpose than in the 
mode alluded to is anywhere given in the Constitution, 
by implication or otherwise, and that the mode thereby 
provided appears manifestly to have been carefully 
considered, and the power of altering the Constitution 
thereby conferred to have been cautiously restrained 
and guarded, we think a strong implication arises 
against the existence of any other power under the 
Constitution for the same purposes." (Italics ours.) 
The Court then declines to decide what would be the effect 
of a purported law, submitting to the people the question of 
calling a convention and as to what would be the power of 
such convention if called. The effect of its statement upon 
this subject is that, without committing itself to the legality 
or constitutionality of such a convention, nevertheless if, in 
fact, called, its powers would in any event be restricted in 
such manner as the General Assembly should have directed 
in calling it. 
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It is freely admitted that the ease does not go quite to the 
point of the Rhode Island case, but nobody can read it fairly 
without believing that the Court disapproved of the conven-
tion method where the Constitution was silent thereon and 
where another express mode of amendment was provided; 
and that the convention method was not one which could be 
justified under the provisions of the Constitution. But if that 
is so, it is not constitutional. To our minds it is therefore 
unconstitutional. 
Let us examine in another aspect into the alleged distinc-
tion between the Massachusetts and the Rhode Island cases. 
The opposing contention appears to assume that the Massa-
chusetts case was right, as the Court was dealing with "par-
ticular amendments," but that the Rhode Island Court was 
wrong because it was dealing with a "revision." In other 
words, it appears to be conceded that if the Constitution is 
to be "amended," the method prescribed by the Constitution 
must be followed, but that if it is to be "revised" either the 
legislative method or the convention method is available. 
1. Impossibility of distinguishing legally between 
"Amendment" and "Revision". 
This view necessarily requires an exact definition of and 
distinction between "amendment" and "revision." We do 
not wish to be too legalistic, as we realize that the question 
before the Court is essentially a broad one; but after all, 
while we are dealing in essence with ideas, ideas can here be 
expressed only in words; and to learn what ideas are behind 
the words we must resort to the meanings (ideas) which 
those words customarily and properly bear and express. 
Both "amend" and "revise" undoubtedly fall within the 
scope of the generic word "change"; and the opposition must 
therefore clearly indicate when a change which begins as an 
amendment becomes so sweeping that it is no longer an 
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amendment, but is a revision; and must also demonstrate 
that "amendment" is not broad enough to include "revision." 
We therefore inquire: I s a change restricted to a modifica-
tion of the article providing for the qualification of electors 
an amendment only? Apparently in the ordinary use of 
language it would be. Suppose i t is coupled with an amend-
ment providing that the tenure of the Justices of the Supreme 
Court shall be for life or during good behavior. Are we still 
dealing with amendments? Suppose there is a change solely 
in the provision for the representation of towns and cities in 
the Senate, and nothing else. That would apparently be an 
amendment. If it is coupled with the two modifications pre-
viously mentioned, have we a revision? 
It is no answer to assert, as do the Twenty-Six Lawyers, 
that this is a political question to be determined by the legis-
lature, and nothing with which the Courts have to do. We 
are dealing here with rights of a most sovereign and high 
character—the constitutional rights of the people—and the 
legislature has no power to infringe those rights nor indi-
rectly to destroy them by making its own incorrect definition 
of the meaning of words, and then escaping responsibility on 
the ground that i ts action is political and not subject to re-
view. The Supreme Court, the final guardian and arbiter of 
constitutional rights, must assume the burden of determin-
ing (if the theory of distinction between "amendment" and 
"revision" now considered be sound) at what point the legis-
lative method is no longer required and a convention can 
properly commence to function. 
This difficulty was clearly in the minds of the Judges in 
1883. Their opinion disposed of the question by holding that 
since, under the Federal Constitution, a Republican form of 
Government was guaranteed, and since the great principles 
established by the Bill of Rights and the separation of pow-
ers into three departments must unquestionably form a par t 
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of any new, as well as of the old, constitution, such changes 
as might be considered proper would all necessarily fall into 
the class of amendments; and that for this reason, among 
others, the legislative method prescribed by the Constitution 
was the only one which could constitutionally be followed in 
altering the fundamental law. 
The Court was right. The words "amend" and "revise" 
are not words of ar t or science. They are not susceptible of 
such close definition that it is possible to determine with 
legal accuracy where one leaves off and the other begins. I t 
is the old Greek philosophical problem of the "heap." They 
used to pour out a few particles of sand and ask whether 
there was yet a heap. If the answer was "No" they would 
add grains until someone said "Heap," whereupon they 
would take away one grain of sand, and ask why it had 
ceased to be a heap. So here. Particular amendments can be 
added until someone says "Now you are making a revision," 
and you can remove one amendment and ask why it has 
ceased to be a revision and is only a group of amendments. 
In Bouvier's Law Dictionary we find "AMENDMENT. In 
legislation. An alteration or change of something proposed 
in a bill or established as law." Bouvier does not define 
either "revision" or "revise." 
Century Dictionary, among other definitions, defines 
"amend" as follows: 
"To make a change or changes in the form of, as a 
bill or motion, or a constitution; properly, to improve 
in expression or detail, but, by usage, to alter, either in 
construction, purport or principle." 
"AMENDMENT. 3. In deliberative assemblies. An 
alteration proposed to be made in the draft of a bill or 
in the terms of a motion under discussion. Any such 
alteration is termed an amendment, even when its effect 
is entirely to reverse the sense of the original bill or 
motion. 
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"4. An alteration of a legislative or deliberative act 
or in a constitution; a change made in a law either by 
way of correction or addition." 
Ibid. "REVISE. 1. To look carefully over with a 
view to correction. . . . 
"2. To amend; bring into conformity with present 
needs and circumstances; reform, especially by public 
or official action." (Italics ours.) 
Ibid. "REVISION. 1. The act of revision; re-ex-
amination and correction; as the revision of statistics; 
the revision of a book, of a creed, etc." 
I t will be noted that there is no possibility of clear dis-
tinction between the terms, that "amendment" carries the 
generic meaning of change or alteration, and that one of 
the definitions of "revise" is "amend." 
The constitutional rights of the people ought not to be 
dependent upon such elusive shades of meaning, with respect 
to which the best minds may honestly be in grave doubt. The 
law, especially the fundamental law, ought not to be in-
volved in a great mystery—it should be simple, plain and 
straightforward, with rights and duties fully and plainly 
set forth. 
The opposite view results in a conclusion which is at least 
surprising, not to say absurd. I t is insisted upon the other 
side (1) that the people have a perpetual and inalienable 
right at any time to make or remake their Constitution with-
out regard to previous constitutional limitations. (2) I t is 
conceded, however, that with respect to "amendments" the 
constitutional method must be followed, i. e., approved by 
two legislatures and ratification by a three-fifths vote of the 
people. Opinion of the Justices, 6 Cush. (Mass.) 573. 
But, by hypothesis, "amendments" are considered less 
sweeping and of relatively less consequence than "revisions." 
I t may therefore be asked, why have the people power to do 
the most important thing, but have no power to do the less 
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important thing? On all principles of logic it would be sup-
posed that the greater includes the less; but not so under the 
theory now being considered. The people must follow the 
legislative mode, involving the expiration of two years before 
they can make a minor amendment to their Constitution, 
but, it is insisted by our opponents, can sweep away in its 
entirety the old constitutional fabric within a few weeks. 
The whole difficulty, in this respect, arises from the as-
sumption that a precise and scientific distinction can be 
made between terms which in themselves are not precise or 
scientific, and the consequent effort to make the most funda-
mental rights of sovereignty turn upon the distinction thus 
attempted to be made. The conclusions to be drawn under 
that theory must always be confused and vague because the 
factors involved in the problem are themselves indetermin-
ate. I t was doubtless for this very sound reason that the 
makers of our present system specified one distinct and prac-
ticable method by which amendments were to be proposed 
and adopted or rejected, a method nicely calculated to allow 
ample time and careful deliberation before fundamental 
rights were affected, and to make certain that the result at-
tained represented the permanent views of the electorate and 
not those of a possibly transient majority. As the Court well 
said: 
"The object was not to hamper or baffle the popular 
will, but to insure its full expression. Our ancestors 
knew what we all know, that in spite of all precaution 
a majori ty may be worked up for an occasion which is 
not the true and permanent majority. They also knew, 
what we all know, that many electors, perfectly satisfied 
with the existing state of things, stay away from the 
polls on Election Day from mere inertness of tempera-
ment. I t is inconceivable to us that they would have 
elaborated so guarded a mode of amendment, unless 
they had intended to have it exclusive and controlling." 
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And certainly, where a clear, distinct, practicable, and 
elaborate method of amendment is plainly set forth in the 
instrument itself, it is nothing but common sense to conclude 
that that method, and that method only, was the one intend-
ed to be adopted if changes, whether of "amendment" or of 
"revision," were to be undertaken. Insofar as a distinction 
may be taken between the two expressions, then certainly 
deliberation, debate, reflection, and calm consideration are 
more important where changes are to be sweeping than 
where they are in matters of form or detail. 
E. Analysis of Opposing Views 
1. Answer to the Brief of the Twenty-six Lawyers. 
As above stated, some ten years ago a memorandum in the 
form of a brief was prepared and signed by twenty-six prom-
inent attorneys, all leaders in the Democratic Party, en-
titled "A Constitutional Convention in Rhode Island," 
strongly criticising the opinion of the Rhode Island Court 
in 1883, and upholding the convention method of amend-
ment. Among its signers were the present Governor, Hon. 
William W. Moss, now a member of this Court, and Hon. 
Patrick H. Quinn and Hon. Thomas F. Cooney, of counsel in 
this case. As that brief appears to have been carefully pre-
pared, it will be proper to examine the points advanced 
therein. 
(i) Section 1, Article I, is to be construed in connection 
with Article XIII. 
By far the greatest emphasis is laid upon the proper inter-
pretation of the first part of Section 1 of Article I, in which 
is stated "The right of the people to make and alter their 
constitutions of government," but considerably less atten-
tion is paid to the balance of this Section, which provides, 
"but that the Constitution which at any time exists, till 
changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, 
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is sacredly obligatory upon all." The brief argues that this 
Section enunciates a "fundamental principle . . . namely that 
the people of the several States of the American Union retain 
sovereign power," subject only to the provisions of the Fed-
eral Constitution. That principle has often been stated; but 
the retention of sovereign power is quite consistent in the 
formation of the social compact with a binding statement of 
the terms upon which that power is to be exercised. 
(ii) Nature of Constitution and authorities thereon. 
What is a Constitution? I t is the fundamental law of 
government, and government is a compact between the whole 
people and each individual; and between each individual and 
the whole people, and whereby the whole people agree to 
protect the rights of the individual and the individual agrees 
to give to the government of the whole people the measure of 
support which they may require within the limitations of the 
Constitution. And each individual who remains or comes 
under the operation of the Constitution is conclusively pre-
sumed to have assented to the terms of this compact. There-
fore, neither party to this governmental compact is a t lib-
erty to break the contract without the assent of the other. 
(The foregoing and succeeding definitions and quotations 
are, in substance, taken from Mr. Sheffield's monograph.) 
Rousseau says that 
"The social compact can be formed only by unani-
mous consent, because the rule itself that a majority 
of votes shall prevail can only be established by agree-
ment, that is by compact." 
Henry Clay, speaking of Rhode Island affairs in 1842, said, 
"How is this right of the people to abolish an existing 
government and to set up a new one to be practically 
exercised? Who are the people that are to tear up the 
whole fabric of human society whenever and as often 
as caprice or passion may prompt them? When all the 
arrangements and ordinances of existing and organized 
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society are prostrated and subverted . . . all the 
offspring of positive institutions are cast down and 
abolished and society is thrown into one heterogeneous 
and unregulated mass. . . . As often and wherever 
society can be drummed up and thrown into such a 
shapeless mass, the major par t of it may establish an-
other, and another new government in endless success. 
Why, this would overturn all social organizations, make 
revolution—the extreme and last resort of an oppressed 
people—the commonest occurrence of human life and 
the standing order of the day." 
John C. Calhoun said that only in civil society are ma-
jorities and minorities known to have any rights. Those 
rights are political and derived from agreement or a com-
pact. How absurd it is then to suppose that the right of a 
majority to alter or abolish the Constitution is a natural 
right. The right of altering or changing a Constitution is a 
conventional right belonging to the body politic and subject 
to be regulated by it. 
Mr. Madison in the Federalist No. 43 says, 
"A faction is a majority or minority of the whole 
who are united and actuated by some common impulse 
of passion or interest, adverse to the rights of the other 
citizens or to the permanent and aggregate interest of 
the community." 
And in Federalist No. 51 he said, 
"In a society under the forms of which the stronger 
factions unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as 
truly be said to exist as in a state of nature." 
And, by Chancellor Kent, 
"The Constitution is the act of the people speaking 
in their original character and defining the permanent 
conditions of the social alliance." 
In 1790, Madison wrote to Jefferson as follows: 
"On what principle is it that the voice of the majority 
binds the minority? I t does not result, I conceive, 
from a law of nature but from a compact founded on 
utility. A greater proportion might be required by the 
fundamental constitution of society, if under any par-
ticular circumstances it were judged eligible. Prior, 
therefore, to the establishment of this principle, 
unanimity was necessary, and rigid theory accordingly 
presupposes the assent of every individual to the rule 
which subjects the minority to the will of the majority." 
Curtis, in his History of the Federal Constitution, says 
(Volume 2, Page 474), 
"The existence and operation of a prescribed method 
of changing particular features of a government mark 
the line between amendment and revolution, and render 
a resort to the latter, for the purpose of melioration or 
reform save in extreme cases of oppression unnecessary. 
According to our American theory of government, revo-
lution and amendment both rest upon the doctrine that 
the people are the source of political power, and each 
of them is the exercise of an ultimate right. But this 
right is exercised in the process of amendment in a 
prescribed form which preserves the continuity of the 
existing government, and changes only such of its 
fundamental rules as require revision without the de-
struction of any public or private rights that may have 
become vested under the former rule. Revolution, on 
the contrary, proceeds without form, is the violent dis-
ruption of the obligations resting on the authority of 
the former government, and terminates its existence 
often without saving any of the rights which may have 
grown up under it. . . . Without an ascertained and 
limited proceeding (in amending the Constitution) all 
change becomes in effect revolutionary. . . ." 
And Cooley, "Constitutional Limitations", says (page 30) 
that "the people" is the body of electors created under the 
Constitution, and even they can amend the Constitution only 
by legitimate modes, which must either be prescribed in the 
Constitution, or, in the absence of a prescribed mode, by au-
thority of a law making power. 
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In his History of Michigan, page 345, he says that, 
"The written instrument comes into existence with 
the understanding and purpose that its several para-
graphs and provisions shall mean forever exactly what 
they mean when adopted; and if a change is to take 
place in the Constitution i t must be brought about by 
the steps which in the instrument itself are provided 
for." 
The Iowa Court in Koehler & Lange vs. Hill, 60 la. 543, 
said that, 
" I t matters not if not only every elector, but every 
adult person in the State should desire and vote for an 
amendment to the Constitution, it cannot be recognized 
as valid unless such vote was held in pursuance of, 
and in substantial accord with the requirements of the 
Constitution." 
(iii) The people can and often do voluntarily place 
limitations upon the exercise of their sovereign power. 
This principle is worthy of a little more consideration 
since i t is believed that at this point the opposing view is 
derived from assumptions which are in t ruth unfounded. 
Our adversaries iterate and reiterate that it is the people— 
the people—who are to rule and that if a majority of them 
(apparently meaning the electors) manifest a desire for 
change in the fundamental law, the change at once becomes 
rightful and constitutional. Perhaps the authorities above 
mentioned sufficiently meet this position, but let us approach 
it for a moment on principle. 
Mr. Sheffield gives the illuminating example of twelve 
castaways upon a desert island, starting in a state of nature 
and without law. Have seven of them a natural right to 
impose their will upon the remaining five? Can they law-
fully and rightfully enact that all the work of the com-
munity shall be done by the five, and would there be any-
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thing unlawful in the minority withdrawing to another part 
of the island to live as they chose? The answer is obvious. 
In such circumstances the majority has no legal rights. If 
they govern, it is either by force or because the five agree 
or acquiesce. But if the twelve agree then you have an or-
ganized society ruled by law, which cannot be lawfully 
changed without the assent of the minority and according 
to the rules laid down. True, the majority rules, but it 
rules in accordance with limitations, voluntarily submitted 
to by the majority, for the benefit of all ; and legal change 
cannot thereafter be made except in accordance with the 
compact. 
The remarks of Daniel Webster in the case of Luther vs. 
Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849) are often quoted by the proponents 
of the other view. As Judge Durfee in his monograph 
points out, however, (page 52) Mr. Webster in that case 
was an advocate whose purpose was to show that it had 
been the practice of the people of the several States to pass 
a statute leading to a constitutional change before making 
it, t. e., he was endeavoring to discredit the Dorr movement, 
and was using the State of New York as the most recent 
example, being one where a constitutional convention had 
been called pursuant to an act of the legislature. He was 
not considering whether that statute was constitutional. In 
his works, however, he spoke more closely to the point. 
Judge Durfee quotes him as follows: 
" I t is one principle of the American system that the 
people limit their governments, national and state. 
They do so; but it is another principle, equally true and 
certain, and, according to my judgment of things, equal-
ly important, that the people often limit themselves. 
They set bounds to their own power. They have chosen 
to secure the institutions which they establish against 
the sudden impulses of mere majorities. All our in-
stitutions teem with instances of this. I t was their 
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great conservative principle, in constituting forms of 
government, that they should secure what they had 
established against hasty changes by simple major-
ities." 
So, under the Federal Constitution, it requires the ap-
plication of legislatures of two-thirds of the States to call a 
convention, and amendments proposed in any mode must 
be ratified by legislatures or conventions of three-fourths 
of the States. 
"The fifth article of the constitution, if it was made 
a topic for those who framed 'the people's convention' 
of Rhode Island, could only have been a matter of re-
proach. I t gives no countenance to any of these pro-
ceedings or to anything like them. On the contrary, it 
is one remarkable instance of the enactment and appli-
cation of that great American principle, that the con-
stitution of government should be cautiously and pru-
dently interfered with, and that changes should not 
ordinarily be begun and carried through by bare ma-
jorities." 
A perfect example of the voluntary limitation of the 
power of majorities is found in the United States Constitu-
tion itself. Under it the States granted constitutional pow-
ers to the Federal Government, effective when adopted by 
nine States. Under that Constitution, however, changes 
may be made and sovereignty resumed by the States, not by 
the act of a majority, but by the act of three-fourths of the 
States which have thus joined together, acting either 
through conventions or through the legislatures. The exer-
cise of the ultimate sovereignty of the United States is 
vested, therefore, not in the majority of the people or a ma-
jority of the States, but absolutely and solely in three-
fourths of the States. How, then, can it be said that a mere 
majority necessarily have the reserved right to change the 
Constitution at any moment? 
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I t seems clear that one of the primary purposes of a Con-
stitution is to preserve the rights of the minority against 
the majority until changes are made in the mode provided 
by the compact itself. Of what use is a Constitution to a 
minority if it can be changed at any time at the whim of a 
bare majority? If so, as Mr. Clay points out, it is subject 
to frequent and capricious change, always leading to the 
possibility of the destruction of all the rights which have 
grown up under it. If changed otherwise we are driven to 
the conclusion that i t is a revolutionary and not a consti-
tutional alteration. And Section 1 itself solemnly enacts 
that "the Constitution which at any time exists, till changed 
by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is 
sacredly obligatory upon all." What is an explicit and au-
thentic act of the whole people? I t is submitted that to be 
constitutionally explicit it must be constitutionally ex-
pressed ; and that to be authentic it must both be legal and 
be duly and legally authenticated or evidenced. But in our 
Constitution, the mode by which it is to be made explicit and 
authentic is expressed in only one place and in only one 
mode, and that is in accordance with Article XII I . 
(iv) Section 10 of Article IV of the Constitution is sub-
ject to the implied prohibition of Article XIII. 
I t is fur ther claimed upon the other side that since Sec-
tion 10 of Article IV continues in the General Assembly 
"the powers they have heretofore exercised," and since, prior 
to 1842, the legislature called several conventions, that pow-
er is preserved to it by the Constitution. This claim, how-
ever, turns out to be a mere restatement of the original 
question; for the same Section 10 preserves the powers of 
the Assembly, by its terms, subject to an express limitation, 
i. e., "unless prohibited in this Constitution"; and, as al-
ready demonstrated, and as so ably set forth by Judge Dur-
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fee and Mr. Sheffield, the power to call a convention is, in 
fact, necessarily, though impliedly, prohibited by consider-
ing Article X I I I in connection with Article I, Section 1. 
That such prohibition exists would appear established by 
the unbroken usage of ninety-two years and by the invari-
able adoption of the method of amendment prescribed in 
Article XI I I . 
This matter of implied prohibition is one which our op-
ponents do not concede. In the brief of the Twenty-Six 
Lawyers above mentioned, the ground is repeatedly taken 
that while the grant of an ordinary power may and usually 
does imply the denial of any other power, as, for example, 
in a deed, mortgage or will, such implication is not to be 
made in construing the provisions of a Constitution, because 
that is formulated by the sovereign power, against which 
no implications are to be made. That the grant of a con-
stitutional power may imply the denial of another clearly 
appears, however, from a consideration of several instances. 
The precise point has been before our Supreme Court, among 
others, In re Opinion of the Supreme Court upon the Act 
passed by the General Assembly at its January Session, 1854, 
Reversing and Annulling the Judgment against Thomas W. 
Dorr, 3 R. I. 299, and also in Taylor vs. Place, 4 R. I. 324. 
The Dorr case dealt with an Act of the Assembly pur-
porting to annul the judgment of the Supreme Court for 
treason rendered against Thomas W. Dorr. The Constitu-
tion, by Article I I I , provided "The powers of the govern-
ment shall be distributed in three departments; the legis-
lative, executive, and judicial." I t will be noted that this 
is an affirmative delegation of power. From it, however, 
the Court implied a negative, holding that since the judicial 
power was separate from the legislative, the legislative did 
not have the judicial power assumed by it in the passage 
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of this Act, and declared the Act unconstitutional, with the 
words 
"The power exclusively conferred upon the one de-
partment is, by necessary implication, denied to the 
other. The Courts, therefore, cannot enact laws. 
Their power is to judge and determine, to declare what 
the law at any time is, not what it ought to be or shall 
be" (p. 301). 
For the same reason the General Assembly cannot right-
fully exercise the judicial power. That is conferred upon 
the Courts and necessarily prohibited to the General As-
sembly. 
There, as here, it was claimed that judicial power con-
tinued in the Assembly under Section 10 of Article IV— 
inasmuch as judicial powers, prior to the Constitution, had 
customarily been exercised by the Assembly. I t was held 
that the implied prohibition was, nevertheless, effective. 
And in line with our argument above as to the authority 
and weight attaching to a construction long accepted, the 
Court in the Dorr case also had this to say: 
"If the practice of the General Assembly, down to 
the adoption of the Constitution, had been to exercise 
such a jurisdiction, and such practice has been discon-
tinued since, i t is fair to presume it was discontinued 
because inconsistent with that instrument." (3 R. I. 
at 308.) 
Similarly here. Since the Assembly has not once since 
1843 passed an Act to call a constitutional convention, al-
though calling four of them prior to adoption of the Con-
stitution, "it is fair to presume that it (the practice) was 
discontinued because inconsistent with that instrument." 
As the Court, however, by dictum, recognized the propri-
ety of a portion of the judicial functions of the Assembly, 
the matter came up again and was finally settled by the 
opinion of Chief Justice Ames in Taylor vs. Place, 4 R. I. 
412 
324. In a lengthy and profound opinion he flatly held that 
from and after the adoption of the Constitution all judicial 
powers were by implication prohibited to the General As-
sembly, saying that the provisions of Section 10 of Article 
IV that "The General Assembly shall continue to exercise 
the powers they have heretofore exercised unless prohibited 
in this Constitution" did not justify the exercise! of judicial 
powers, since those are expressly vested by the Constitution 
in the Supreme and inferior Courts; which, by necessary 
implication, prevents their exercise by the legislative de-
partment. He fur ther holds that the expressed distribu-
tion of powers is "for the purpose of preventing each de-
partment from exercising those appropriate to the others." 
At page 361 he emphasizes 
"That in matters of doubtful interpretation, the long 
continued practice of the other departments of the gov-
ernment, acquiesced in by the people, under such an in-
strument, is often properly resorted to by the Courts, 
for the purpose of ascertaining its meaning; and even 
the authentic debates of the body which framed the 
Constitution have, though with caution, been used in 
such matters for the same purpose." 
In that connection at this point it is perhaps proper to 
refer to the fact that an amendment was actually proposed 
in the convention which adopted our Constitution by Mr. 
Ennis to Section 1 of Article I, which was rejected. That 
amendment would have made the first Section substantially 
identical with that of Pennsylvania, the dicta of two opin-
ions from which have been much relied upon in opposition 
to our contention. Mr. Ennis's rejected amendment to Sec-
tion 1 read as follows: 
"Section First. All political power and sovereignty 
are originally vested in and of right belong to the peo-
ple. All free governments are founded in their authori-
ty and are established for the greatest good of the whole 
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number. The people have, therefore, an inalienable 
and indefeasible right? in their original sovereignty and 
unlimited capacity to alter, reform or totally change the 
same whenever their safety or happiness requires." See 
journal of the Constitutional Convention of 1842 in the 
State archives under date of September 13, 1842. 
But it is said on the other side that there is a distinction 
between an implication against another branch of the gov-
ernment, such as the General Assembly, and an implication 
against the sovereign; and that while the first may be proper 
(Taylor vs. Place), the second is out of order, i. e. that no 
implication by affirmative words can arise against the sov-
ereign, i. e. the State or people. 
That the asserted distinction is unsupportable both in 
theory and in practice is ably pointed out by Judge Durfee 
in his monograph. By hypothesis, and as established in 
Taylor vs. Place (supra), an implication can arise against 
a department of the government, e. g. the legislative, which 
is not the sovereign but a creature and delegate of the sov-
ereign. And whether or not an implication can arise 
against the sovereign is logically not here material, for it is 
the General Assembly which is contemplated as the body 
assuming to call a constitutional convention, and not the 
people; so that the doctrine of implied prohibition still ap-
plies with ful l force against action by the legislative depart-
ment in taking steps to alter the Constitution, which created 
it, otherwise than in the constitutional mode prescribed. 
And that implied prohibitions can be, and have been made 
against the sovereign is demonstrated, among other in-
stances, in connection with the unlawful and unconstitu-
tional secession of the Southern States in 1861. By the 
Constitution, they had conferred definite and limited powers 
upon the United States, and had expressly declared that all 
powers not so conferred or enumerated were reserved to the 
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respective states or to the people. I t was not stated that 
the sovereign states could not secede. Everyone knows the 
answer. The Civil War decided the question, and the Su-
preme and State Courts have repeatedly adjudicated that 
secession was unconstitutional, and that a necessary impli-
cation arose from the power granted to the Federal Govern-
ment that that power should not, without the consent of 
the United States, be revested in the respective sovereign 
states. That would appear to dispose once and for all of 
the theory that implications against the sovereign cannot 
be derived from an affirmatively granted power. 
In the brief of the Twenty-Six Lawyers, a good deal is 
made of the point that in two cases decided af ter the rendi-
tion of the Opinion of the Justices in 1883, our Court found 
it proper to distinguish between the principles then applied 
and those which were effective in the cases in question. The 
argument is somewhat labored and need not be taken up in 
detail. What we desire to emphasize, however, in each of 
them is this: Each was an adjudicated case involving a ju-
dicial decision, and in each the Court referred with approval 
to its Opinion as rendered to the Senate in 1883. 
State vs. Kane, 15 R. I. 395 (1886); 
Higgins vs. Tax Assessors of Pawtucket, 27 R. I. 401 
(1905). 
I t does not appear to us of great moment or to be a ground 
of adversary criticism that the Court distinguished those 
cases from the Opinion. Surely an earlier opinion can be 
distinguished from a later one without impairing its value 
as a precedent. I t is done every day. The real fact which 
is important, and which cannot be escaped, is that in two 
adjudicated cases the views expressed in the opinion Re 
Convention in 14 R. I. have been expressly approved and 
reaffirmed. 
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In that brief or memorandum of the Twenty-Six Lawyers 
are repeated the arguments made originally by Judge Brad-
ley and Abraham Payne in their pamphlets published in 
1885 ("The Methods of Changing the Constitution of the 
States, especially that of Rhode Island") that in a substan-
tial number of States whose Constitutions, generally speak-
ing have provisions for amendment in the legislative mode 
but are silent with respect to amending through constitu-
tional conventions, conventions have nevertheless been 
called, and have submitted to the people new or revised Con-
stitutions which have been adopted. The same point is em-
phasized by certain text writers who deal with this matter, 
e. g. Jameson on Constitutional Conventions, 4th Ed. Sec-
tions 573, 574, where he criticizes the opinion of the Rhode 
Island Court. See also Hoar "Constitutional Conventions, 
Their Nature, Powers and Limitations " pages 46-66. 
The fact is freely conceded: the legal inferences remain 
unchanged. While the instances mentioned are precedents 
as respects what has been done politically, they are without 
weight as judicial authorities, and ought not to affect the 
opinion of a judicial tribunal which is asked what can law-
fully be done. All of such changes, in our opinion, were 
in their nature revolutionary and extra-legal, that is to say 
unconstitutional. Of course, if a political act of that type 
takes place, if the people by a majority purport to adopt 
a new Constitution so submitted, if a system of government 
is organized thereunder, and Courts are established or con-
tinued in pursuance of i ts provisions, i t is idle, short of a 
resort to arms, to contend that the new government is with-
out force in law or under the Constitution. No court can 
properly attack the government or Constitution of which 
it is the creature, and such attacks are therefore not made. 
This principle is illustrated by Taylor vs. Commonwealth, 
301 Va. 829 (1903). A constitutional convention was called 
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by a direct vote of the people and itself framed and adopted 
a Constitution without submitting it to the people for ratifi-
cation. The government was organized and acted upon un-
der the new Constitution, which was proclaimed by the Gov-
ernor as directed therein. I t was recognized by the General 
Assembly, and the judiciary took oath thereunder. The 
Court found that it had been acquiesced in by the people 
by peacefully accepting it and registering as voters there-
under. Under it the defendant was found guilty of felony 
without trial by jury, and he challenged the constitutionali-
ty of the new instrument. The Court held that as a matter 
of fact the new Constitution was in force throughout the 
State 
"and there being no government in existence under the 
previous Constitution, opposing or denying its validity, 
we have no difficulty in holding that the Constitution 
in question . . . is the only rightful, valid and ex-
isting Constitution of this State." 
The Court did not pass upon the question as to whether 
the convention was without power to promulgate the Con-
stitution, for which i t gave two reasons. (1) Because there 
was no library available in which it could investigate the 
question. (2) That even if the convention was without legal 
power it would not change the result of this case, i. e., the 
Court being itself the creature of the new "Constitution" 
felt that it could not question the validity of the instrument 
under which it itself was acting. The case has weight only 
as recognizing a political as distinguished from a constitu-
tional or legal principle. 
See to the same effect Loomis vs. Jackson, 6 W. Va. 613, 
708. There are a number of other cases which express the 
same view. 
But, again as Judge Durfee said in his monograph, while 
such instances are pertinent he does not value them as 
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precedents because (1) we are not told how often such 
changes have been rejected, when proposed, because uncon-
stitutional; (2) the Constitutions of the several States have 
their differences as well as their resemblances, and what is 
wrong under one may be right under another; (3) the spe-
cial provision. Article XI I I , which is so clearly mandatory 
in our Constitution may be less clearly so in another, or it 
may be accompanied by some other clause which counter-
vails its restrictive effect; (4) if the declaratory clause, 
which was offered and rejected in the convention which 
framed our Constitution (see supra, p. 42, Ennis amend-
ment) had been adopted, we might, find it more difficult to 
maintain that the special provision (Article X I I I ) is ex-
clusive and controlling; and (5) as to certain cases which 
are substantially similar to ours on the political side, Judge 
Durfee has this to say: 
"That the legislature of no other state can decide for 
the people of Rhode Island what is the meaning of their 
Constitution, or absolve them from their duty to sup-
port and obey it according to the meaning which it has 
in Rhode Island. A legislative precedent is not like a 
judicial precedent, for legislatures give no reasons for 
their decisions, and we cannot know what arguments 
or influences may have prevailed with them. . . . A 
legislature is not generally well fitted to decide legal 
or constitutional questions." 
F. No Judicial Decision Has Been Found 
Contrary to Our Position 
We are in no wise disturbed because certain text-
writers have shown an inclination to criticise the Opinion 
of the Justices of 1883. Jameson, Dodd and Hoar rely for 
their position upon the fact that the Legislatures of a num-
ber of other states have assumed to call constitutional con-
ventions where the constitutions of those states were silent 
as to the existence of such power, and where a legislative 
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mode of amendment was provided. That argument appears 
sufficiently met by the observations of Judge Durfee above 
alluded to. They are political and not judicial precedents. 
Dodd refers to only three cases in support of his position 
and himself describes those cases as dicta upon the point. 
T H E REVISION AND A M E N D M E N T OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS, 
page 46. 
And we may as well say here that notwithstanding the 
great extent of the discussion upon the subject and the very 
lengthy period of time during which that discussion has 
taken place, we find nowhere in the whole range of the dis-
cussion, and our own researches have not produced, a single 
judicial decision contrary to the opinion of the Justices, 
upon the question before us here. There are a number of 
obiter dicta not necessary to recorded decisions, and much 
is made of them by text-writers and proponents of the op-
posing view. I t seems unfortunate, but inevitable, that 
courts—even the ablest—when presented with constitutional 
questions, have so often thought it necessary in their opin-
ions to explore large areas in the constitutional field in no 
way involved with the precise questions at issue. That 
Judge Durfee and Judge Shaw in the Rhode Island and 
Massachusetts cases, respectively, were able to restrict 
themselves to profound, comprehensive, yet brief decisions 
of the points before them, is but another instance of their 
preeminent ability. 
G. Even Were It Otherwise, Rhode Island Should 
Maintain Its Own Established Position 
But even though certain text-writers hold with the politi-
cal practice which has in the past obtained in a few of our 
sister states, we repeat that we are quite willing to be con-
sidered "peculiar" by those authorities. I t is not the first 
time that Rhode Island has at the same time been both "dif-
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ferent" and right—indeed, that is our chief claim to an 
enduring place in history. 
The state was founded by a reformer who found himself 
at odds with the viewpoint of all of his neighbors in Massa-
chusetts. I t made him great. The state broke new ground 
in America in establishing its fundamental principle recog-
nized in the Royal Charter that 
"no person within the said colony at any time hereafter 
shall be in any wise molested, punished, disquieted or 
called in question for any differences in opinion in mat-
ters of religion"; 
which also contained the declaration of the founders that 
it was much on their hearts 
"to hold forth a lively experiment that a most flourish-
ing civil state may stand and best be maintained, and 
that among our English subjects, with a full liberty of 
religious concernments." 
This was, for the time, peculiar—it has become our chief 
claim to fame and the admiration of posterity. 
We were the first to declare our independence of Great 
Britain—the last to subscribe to the United States Con-
stitution ; the last, also, of the original colonies to adopt 
our own Constitution. More recently, when prohibition 
was the burning issue, we were one of the two states which, 
alone among the forty-eight, declined and continued to de-
cline to ratify the Eighteenth Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution. Our judgment has been confirmed by its re-
cent repeal. In the light of our history and experience, 
therefore, we need not be too much concerned that a few 
states have taken political action contrary to our own tradi-
tion, nor that certain (but not all—nor the greatest) in-
dividual text-writers feel that the political precedents thus 
established impugn the soundness of the views of our own 
Supreme Court and of most of our leading statesmen before 
and at that time. 
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H. Analysis of Authorities Cited Contra 
We have said that our researches have produced no op-
posing judicial decisions. Let us look at the cases which 
have been, or may be, referred to on the other side. Dodd 
refers to Wells vs. Bain and Wood's Appeal, in Pennsyl-
vania, and Collier vs. Frierson, in Alabama, all of which he 
concedes to be dicta only. 
1. Wells vs. Bain, 75 Pa. St. 39 (1874). 
In that case two points, and two points only, were before 
or decided by the Court: (1) As to whether, when the legis-
lative act providing for the calling of the Constitutional 
Convention designated that the election to be held there-
under should be conducted by the regular statutory election 
officials, it was competent for the Convention to provide that, 
in the City of Philadelphia, the election should be conducted 
under the supervision of their own appointees. The Court's 
answer was "No." (2) The act calling the Convention pro-
vided that upon the request of one-third of the delegates, 
any proposed article should be voted upon separately by 
the people. There was some evidence that a request had 
been made to vote on the article relating to the judiciary 
department by one-third of the Convention. The Court 
held, however, that this was a procedural matter in the Con-
vention and it might be presumed that it acted in accord-
ance with its authority. I t is true that in its opinion the 
Court announced that there were 
"three known recognized modes by which the whole peo-
ple, the state, can give their consent to an alteration 
of an existing lawful frame of government, viz.: 
"1. The mode provided in the existing Constitution. 
"2. A law as the instrumental process of raising the 
body for revision and conveying to it the powers of 
the people. 
"3. A revolution." 
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I t will be observed that the Court said, "recognized modes," 
not "constitutional modes." I t could not have meant the 
latter because one of the modes mentioned was "revolution." 
It also emphasized the declaration of rights in the Penn-
sylvania Constitution, which is substantially broader than 
ours ("have a t all times an inalienable and indefeasible 
right to alter, reform or abolish their government in such a 
manner as they may think proper"), which is in line with 
the rejected form submitted here by Mr. Ennis (supra, 
p. 42). And the Court fur ther said that 
"the people here meant the whole—those who consti-
tute the entire state, male and female citizens, infants 
and adults. A mere majority of those persons who 
are qualified as electors are not the people, though when 
authorized to do so they may represent the whole 
people." 
None of the above argument, whether it be for or against 
the position we maintain, was, as we have demonstrated, 
anything more than dictum. 
2. Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 59 (1874.) 
This was a proceeding by certain citizens to enjoin State 
officials from holding a general election to pass upon a pro-
posed Constitution prepared by a constitutional convention. 
In 1871 the legislature submitted to the people the question 
whether such a convention should be called, and the popular 
vote was affirmative. An act of 1872 provided for the elec-
tion of delegates accordingly, with a proviso for submission 
to the people of any Constitution adopted by the convention. 
Petitioners argued that the act of 1871 was invalid and that 
therefore the convention was not a legal body. The Con-
stitution provided a different method for its amendment 
along the lines of Article X I I I of the Rhode Island Consti-
tution, but included a Bill of Rights similar to that pro-
posed here by Mr. Ennis and rejected by our convention in 
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1842. The Court held the act of 1871 valid and refused the 
injunction, stating that 
"The calling of a convention and regulating its action 
by law is not forbidden in the Constitution." 
The lower Court, the decision of which was affirmed on 
appeal, relied upon the statement of Mr. Webster 
" 'That of the old thirteen States, their Constitutions, 
with one exception, contain no provision for an amend-
ment, yet there is hardly one that has not altered its 
Constitution and it has been done by conventions called 
by the legislature as an ordinary exercise of power' " ; 
and further observes that 
"in view of the foregoing it would seem that the ques-
tion as to whether the calling of a constitutional con-
vention was a legal exercise of power by the legislature 
should now be considered by all judicial tribunals as 
settled so firmly as a part of the common law of our 
government that any attempt to disturb it at this day 
would savor more of revolution than legitimacy. He 
would be bold indeed who would now assert that all 
those conventions were usurpations and that all the 
Constitutions proposed by them and adopted by the 
people were revolutionary." 
I t will be observed that the foregoing was quite outside 
the scope of the actual decision. The question before the 
Court was not, as here, whether the legislature could call a 
convention, but whether it had acted lawfully in submitting 
to the people the question whether such a convention should 
be called—which is no part of the matter now before this 
Court. I t is fur ther to be observed that the Court cites 
only political precedents and not judicial ones. Still more 
important, that the instances of political action upon which 
it relies are those in which the Constitutions of the original 
States "contained no provision for their own amendment"— 
a situation readily distinguishable from that before the 
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Pennsylvania Court, or now before this Court. If boldness 
be required to assert that, in the absence of amendatory 
provision in a Constitution, the adoption of a new one by 
the conventional method is, in its essence and theory, revo-
lutionary, we have the hardihood to make that exact asser-
tion ; and for it we have the support of Chief Justice Durfee 
and of many statesmen and authorities elsewhere referred to 
in this brief. I t comes only to this,—the breach of a social 
compact contrary to its fair meaning is or is not outside 
the law. The compact being the supreme law of the land, 
its breach is outside the law and is therefore in its nature 
a change imposed by force and not by law, i. e., revolu-
tionary. 
3. Collier vs. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100 (1854). 
The sole question in this case was whether a constitutional 
amendment proposed in the mode specified in the Constitu-
tion for its own amendment had been properly adopted. 
The court held that it had not, because the proposed amend-
ment was not properly ratified at the second session of the 
General Assembly; and therefore did not satisfy the consti-
tutional requirements which were similar to our Article 
XI I I . 
The Court, however, by way of dictum, said that the Ala-
bama Constitution could be amended either by the people 
who originally framed it or in the mode prescribed by the 
instrument itself, saying, 
"We entertain no doubt that to change the Consti-
tution in any other mode than by convention, every 
requisite which is demanded by the instrument itself 
must be observed, and the omission of any one is fatal 
to the amendment." 
The expressions quoted are obviously unnecessary to the 
decision and can have no weight against the Opinion of our 
Supreme Court. 
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We should, refer also to two other cases which have been 
cited by the proponents of the other view. The first is, 
(a) State vs. Taylor, 22 N. D. 362 (1911). 
This case has special interest because it accords with our 
position as to the logical impossibility of distinguishing be-
tween "amendment" and "revision". A constitutional 
amendment was proposed and adopted, apparently in ac-
cordance with the method prescribed in the Constitution 
itself, but the Constitution carried a clause that additional 
public institutions in the State should not be established 
"without a revision of this Constitution". I t was claimed 
by petitioners for an injunction that the provision for 
"amendment" did not authorize a "revision", and that there-
fore no revision had taken place, since "revision" is a change 
in the Constitution of such nature that i t could be effected 
only by means of a convention. But it was held that "re-
vision" in the amendatory provisions included "amend-
ment," i. e., that no general review or revision of the Consti-
tution was necessary to make legal the action taken; and the 
Court added that the word "amendment" was used in the 
popular sense to embrace any form of change, alteration 
or revision of the Constitution. So fa r the case is favor-
able. I t does, however, contain a dictum to the following 
effect: 
" I t is also reasonably clear tha t the body of the dele-
gates failed to understand, what seems to be the con-
sensus of authorities at the present time, that the legis-
lative assembly has the inherent power to submit the 
question of calling a constitutional convention to the 
electors." 
These expressions were quite beside the point before the 
Court, and it is significant that the Court omitted to cite 
the "authorities" who constituted the "consensus" men-
tioned. Doubtless i t had in mind, not the judicial, but the 
425 
political precedents so often relied upon by proponents of 
the contrary view. 
The other is 
(b) State vs. Dahl, 6. N. D. 81 (1896). 
This case appears to hold that mandamus will lie to com-
pel the Secretary of State to proceed in accordance with a 
joint resolution of the legislature recommending that at the 
next general election the people should vote on whether a 
constitutional convention should be held, although the con-
ventional method of amendment was not expressly provided 
for in the existing Constitution. The Court says that it is 
"obvious" that the body which is vested with power to desig-
nate the question to be submitted to the people is the legis-
lature. I t is to be noted, however, that in the course of its 
opinion, the Court considerably weakens the force of its own 
position by holding that it is unnecessary for the Court to 
decide the matter, saying 
"It is unnecessary for us to express any opinion on 
the question whether Section 202 of the Constitution, 
prescribing the mode of amending the same, prevents 
the lawful assembling of a constitutional convention 
in this State to revise the fundamental law. The de-
cided weight, of authority and the more numerous 
precedents are arrayed on the side of the doctrine 
which supports the existence of this inherent legisla-
tive power to call a constitutional convention, not-
withstanding the fact that the instrument itself points 
out how it may be amended. See Jameson CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTIONS, Sections 570-574 D. But see In 
Re Constitutional Convention, 14 R. I. 649; Opinion 
of Justices of Supreme Court, 6 Cush. 573." 
It will be observed that the point before the Court was, 
not the right of the Assembly to call a constitutional con-
vention, but to submit to the people the question whether 
such a convention should be called: and that the expressions 
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quoted are merely dicta. I t is also proper to point out that 
although the Court made the observation that the "decided 
weight of authority" was with it, its citations hardly bear it 
out. I t cites in its favor one text writer, in opposition the 
Opinions of two Supreme Courts. It appears difficult to 
support the Court's statement relative to the "decided weight 
of authority." 
The brief of the Twenty-Six Lawyers cited also two cases 
in Indiana as favoring their position. They appear to us 
to support the conclusion for which we stand. 
Ellingham vs. Dye, 178 Ind. 33G. 
The Legislature itself prepared a series of amendments 
to the Constitution which it proposed to submit to popular 
vote. An injunction was sought against the officers desig-
nated to hold the election under the Act. The Court held 
the Act void, citing Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 7th 
ed., 56, as follows: 
" 'By the Constitution which they established they 
not only tie up the hands of our official agencies, but 
their own hands as well; and neither the officers of the 
state nor the whole people as an aggregate body, are 
at liberty to take action in opposition to the funda-
mental l aw. ' " 
I t further held that the Legislature has only delegated 
power to pass laws in the nature of ordinary legislation un-
der the Constitution, and that their legislation proposing 
amendments was not such ordinary legislation. As fas as 
the point actually decided is concerned, i t appears strongly 
to support our own position, but as the opinion contained 
dicta to the effect that the Legislature had the right to call 
a Convention, or at least to submit the question of calling 
such a Convention to the people, it is cited in the brief of the 
Twenty-Six Lawyers as supporting their argument. 
In the same brief another recent Indiana case is cited 
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which is even more strongly in favor of our position. That 
case is 
Bennett vs. Jackson, 186 Ind. 533 (1917). 
There the Constitution neither granted, nor in terms for-
bade, the Legislature to call a Constitutional Convention. 
In 1913 the Assembly submitted to the electors the question 
whether a Constitutional Convention should be called, 
which was voted down by the people by a majority of more 
than one hundred and three thousand. There had been no 
subsequent poll upon the question. Thereafter, the Legis-
lature passed an Act "to provide for the election of dele-
gates to a convention to revise the Constitution of the State," 
and this case was a petition against state officials to declare 
the Act void and to enjoin proceedings thereunder. The 
Court held, by a majority of four to one, that the Act which 
was challenged violated that part of the Bill of Rights 
which gave to the people an indefeasible right to alter and 
reform their government, particularly since the proposal for 
a convention had previously been definitely rejected by the 
people; that since it was conceded that the people had a 
right to create a new Constitution, the only question was 
one of method; that since the Legislature had no inherent 
rights, i t must justify its right to take the initiative in 
calling a convention by a warrant for the same either in the 
Constitution or directly from the people, saying: 
" I t seems to be an almost universal custom in all 
of the states of the Union where the Constitution itself 
does not provide for the calling of the Constitutional 
Convention, to ascertain, first, the will of the people 
and to procure from them a commission to call such a 
convention before the Legislature proceeds to do so. 
The people being the repository of the right to alter or 
reform its government, its will and wishes must be 
consulted before the Legislature can proceed to call a 
convention," citing, 6 R. C. L., Section 17, page 27; 
Hoar, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS, page 68 (1917). 
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Great weight was attached to the people's previous rejection 
of a proposal to call such a convention, and it was said that 
this expression of the will of the people was deemed by the 
court to be as binding on the General Assembly as a positive 
provision of the Constitution. 
The dissenting opinion relies upon its interpretation of 
Cooley, Dodd, Jameson and Hoar, but recognizes the rule 
that 
"when the Constitution provides that a power shall 
be exercised in a particular manner, a failure to com-
ply with the provisions of the Constitution in any 
material respect will vitiate the Act, and the courts 
have power to so declare, . . . if the framers of the 
Constitution of 1851 had prescribed a plan to be fol-
lowed, the Legislature would have been bound to fol-
low the method thus prescribed; but where the Consti-
tution prescribes no plan, the Court is powerless to 
do so" (pp. 543, 551). 
I t will be noted that this case is directly contra to the posi-
tion of our opponents. Here the question is not, "Has the 
Legislature the power to submit to the people the question 
whether a convention shall be called?" but, "Would it be a 
valid exercise of the legislative power if the General Assembly 
should provide by law (a) for a convention to be called to 
revise or amend the Constitution of the State?" In Indiana 
the answer was "No", particularly where (as here) the peo-
ple had previously rejected the proposed amendment to au-
thorize the Assembly to do that very thing. The case was 
doubtless cited by the Twenty-Six Lawyers because in their 
brief they were arguing, not for the calling of a convention 
by the Legislature, but for the propriety of submitting that 
question to the people for their determination. This is 
almost definitely conceded at the end of the Twenty-Six 
Lawyers' brief where they say: 
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"In every given case all doubt could be resolved by 
submitting to the people the question whether a con-
vention should be held. If this should be done and 
the vote be in favor of the convention, no objection 
could be reasonably raised. And if a new constitution 
were thus evolved, the changes would have been 
effected in conformity with sound reason and Ameri-
can precedent. . . . The right of the people to hold 
a convention ought not to be denied on the authority 
of the Court's Opinion in 1883." 
We need hardly say that we deny, with Judge Durfee, the 
constitutional right of the General Assembly even to submit 
to the people the question as to whether a convention should 
be called; but that is not before the Court under the present 
reference and need not be argued a t length. I t may be 
pointed out, however, that even the opposing text-writers, 
along with the twenty-six lawyers, appear to believe that 
(assuming, but not conceding, that the convention method 
is in any wise constitutional) the Legislature is still with-
out power to go further than to submit the question of hold-
ing a convention to the people. But even if that should be 
conceded to be the proper method, Question (a) must still 
be answered "No", for that provides for the calling by the 
Assembly and not for the submission of the question to the 
people. 
As a result of the foregoing review of authorities ad-
versely cited, we again assert that although there are such 
opposing dicta, and although there are certain political 
precedents in which the action now contemplated has ac-
tually been taken in other States, there is not in the United 
States one single judicial decision which has actually held 
contrary to the Opinion of the Justices in Rhode Island of 
1883 upon the point under discussion. 
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I. Submission of Supporting Authorities 
As authorities that that Opinion on the contrary was 
sound and should be here reaffirmed, in addition to the 
Opinion of the Justices in Massachusetts and Bennett vs. 
Jackson (supra, pp. 24, 56), we refer to 
State vs. Kane, 15 R. I. 395 (supra, p. 44) ; 
Higgins vs. Tax Assessors, 27 R. I. 401 (supra, 
p. 4 4 ) ; 
State vs. City of New Orleans, 163 La. Ann. 777 
(1927); 
Koehler & Lange vs. Hill, 60 la . 541; 
State ex re I. Stevenson vs. Tufly, 19 Nev. 391 (1887); 
State vs. McBride, 4 Mo. 303 (1836) ; 
Cooley. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 8th Ed. ( 1 9 2 7 ) . 
No one of the cases above listed is exactly on all fours 
with the Rhode Island case, but the inferences are clear. 
State vs. City of New Orleans, 163 La. Ann. 777, 783 
(1927) (supra). 
The question here was whether a certain act purported 
to be an amendment to the State Constitution. I t was held 
that it was not, but in the course of the opinion the Court 
spoke as follows: 
"The Constitution, by Section 1, Article 21 expressly 
points out when and how amendments to the Constitu-
tion may be proposed and considered by the legislature 
and adopted by a vote of the people when so submitted. 
The manner of proposing and adopting amendments to 
the Constitution as thus provided is exclusive. The 
Constitution cannot be altered, changed, affected, or 
amended in any other manner unless express and direct 
permission is given to the legislature by the Constitu-
tion itself." 
Koehler & Lange vs. Hill, 60 la. 541 (supra). 
This case is elsewhere referred to (supra, p. 36) but 
should also be mentioned again here. An amendment was 
made by the legislative mode, except that differences de-
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veloped between the amendment as spread upon the Journal 
of the House and that finally submitted to vote of the people. 
The second opinion of the Chief Justice held that the Court 
had power itself to examine the House Journal, and, a dis-
crepancy being discovered, that the proposed amendment 
was void, although it had been approved by a very large 
majority of the electorate. 
This holding is inconsistent with the theory that nothing 
is required to amend or alter a Constitution except a ma-
jority vote of the qualified electors. From it it necessarily 
follows that the expression of the popular will, to be effec-
tive, must be in the constitutional mode. 
State ex rel. Stevenson vs. Tufly, 19 Nev. 391 (1887) 
(supra). 
The Nevada Constitution required that proposed amend-
ments should be entered upon the Journal of the Assembly. 
An amendment was proposed in the legislative mode without 
compliance with this provision. I t was, however, voted upon 
by the people and received a substantial majority for adop-
tion, but it was held that the amendment had not been con-
stitutionally made, the Court saying: 
"We conclude that amendments to the Constitution 
can be made only in the mode provided by the instru-
ment itself. * * * These provisions were intended to 
secure care and deliberation on the part of the legisla-
ture and people and are exclusive and controlling" 
(p. 396). 
To precisely the same effect is 
State vs. McBride, 4 Mo. 303 (1836) {supra). 
As above mentioned, Jameson, Dodd and Hoar are inclined 
to criticise the Rhode Island rule. To them we oppose Cooley 
on Constitutional Limitations. In the field we are exploring, 
no commentator stands higher, and this great work has for 
generations been considered authoritative on subjects within 
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its scope. In Chapter 3 of the Eighth Edition, at page 84, 
the rule is stated as follows : 
"In the original States and all others subsequently 
admitted to the Union, the power to amend or revise 
Constitutions resides in the great body of the people 
as an organized body politic, who, being vested with ulti-
mate sovereignty, and the source of all State authority, 
have power to control and alter at will the law which 
they have made. But the people, in the legal sense, 
must be understood to be those who, by the existing 
Constitution, are clothed with political rights, and who, 
while that instrument remains, will be the sole organs 
through which the will of the body politic can be ex-
pressed. * * * 
"But the will of the people to this end can only be 
expressed in the legitimate modes by which such a body 
politic can act, and which must either be prescribed by 
the Constitution whose revision or amendment is 
sought, or by an act of the legislative department of the 
State, which alone would be authorized to speak for 
the people upon this subject, and to point out a mode 
for the expression of their will in the absence of any 
provisions for amendment or revision contained in the 
Constitution itself " 
And at page SI : 
"The people of the Union created a national Consti-
tution, and conferred upon it powers of sovereignty 
over certain subjects, and the people of each State 
created a State government, to exercise the remaining 
powers of sovereignty so f a r as they were disposed to 
allow them to be exercised a t all. By the Constitution 
which they establish, they not only tie up the hands 
of their official agencies, but their own hands as well; 
and neither the officers of the State, nor the whole peo-
ple as an aggregate body, are at liberty to take action in 
opposition to this fundamental law " 
Our position could not be better stated. 
All of our argument to this point has been upon the as-
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sumption that Question (a) is to be read as a part of a plan 
or scheme of proposed constitutional revision, of which plan 
all six questions are component and integral parts, i. e., that 
Question (a) does not contemplate the possibility of a revi-
sion or amendment of the Constitution without the final sub-
mission to the people for their approval or rejection of any 
Constitution which may be drafted in and approved by the 
Convention. 
J. If Question (a) Is a Separate and Independent Ques-
tion, Then Even More Emphatically Its Answer Should 
Be in the Negative. 
If, however, each question is separate (and the questions 
may be so interpreted by this Court), we are confronted by 
an even more serious situation; for the apparent meaning of 
Question (a ) , considered by itself, is, Can the General As-
sembly provide by law for a convention "to revise or amend 
the Constitution", i. e., if such a convention were to be called 
by the General Assembly, can the convention itself adopt and 
promulgate an amended or new constitution without any sub-
mission of the new instrument to the vote of the people? 
It is perhaps needless to say that if that is the proper inter-
pretation of the question (which we can hardly believe), in 
our opinion the answer should be, "No". Not only everything 
we have previously said in the brief, but everything in the 
history of the state, in the Constitution, or in the Declaration 
of Rights, as well as the arguments heretofore advanced even 
by the critics of the opinion of the Justices, is against such 
a result. A contrary position is in effect a flat negative of 
the "right of the people to make and alter their constitutions 
of government". I t is still more in the teeth of the remain-
der of Section 1 of Article I, providing, "that the Constitu-
tion which at any time exists, until changed by an explicit 
and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory 
upon all". 
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True, in two instances, it has been done elsewhere by poli-
tical action—which emphasizes the caution with which poli-
tical precedents are to be considered authoritative by the 
Court. Virginia has done it (supra, p. 45), but the Supreme 
Court of that State, although appointed and acting under 
the provisions of the new Constitution, while admitting its 
inability to impugn the authority under which it itself was 
functioning, expressly declined to pass upon the validity of 
the Constitution thus imposed upon the people. 
Mississippi has done it. See, 
Sproule vs. Fredericks, 69 Miss. 89S (1892). 
The latter case, so fa r as we know, is the only one which 
attempts to justify such a proceeding upon constitutional 
principles. The opinion is in the nature of a deification of a 
Constitutional Convention which is described as a 
"sovereign body—the highest legislative body known to 
free men in a representative government. I t is supreme 
in its sphere. I t wields the powers of sovereignty espe-
cially delegated to it for the purpose. * » * The sole 
limitation upon its powers is tha t no change in the 
form of government shall be done or attempted. The 
spirit of Republicanism must breathe through every 
part of the framework, but the particular fashioning of 
the parts of the framework is confined to the wisdom, 
the faithfulness, and the patriotism of this great con-
vocation representing the people in their sovereignty. 
# # *" (p. 904). 
There is much more in the same strain. I t is perhaps enough 
to say that the Court of Mississippi stands alone in approv-
ing any such annihilation of the ultimate right of the people 
to determine their own form of government. The general 
and correct view of this type of proceeding is set forth in 
Lobingier, "The People's Law", 1909, at pages 330-337. "V. 
The Legal Necessity of Submission". To the same effect see, 
among other cases, 
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Carton vs. Secretary of State, 151 Mich. 337; 
State vs. Erickson, 75 Mont. 429 (1926). 
And even in Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. St. 59, upon which our 
opponents particularly rely, it is held that the convention 
could not take from the people their sovereign right to ratify 
or reject the Constitution framed by the Convention. 
Emphatically, there is no word or phrase in the Constitu-
tion of Rhode Island, and there is nothing in our history, 
even during the turbulent days of the Dorr war, from which 
it can be supposed that our fathers intended their liberties 
thus to be placed at the mercy of an extra-constitutional body 
of delegates selected by a Legislature elected without any 
such mandate. If Question (a) is to be interpreted as con-
templating any such catastrophe, it should unquestionably 
be answered, "No." And for the sake of certainty and clear-
ness upon a point vital to the safety of the Republic, we ven-
ture earnestly to suggest that i f , contrary to our contention, 
this Court should feel that Question (a) should be answered 
in the affirmative upon the assumption that it is a part of a 
general plan contemplating and necessarily leading to the 
submission of any new Constitution to the people, it should 
take care that any such affirmative answer should be so quali-
fied and limited that no one can suppose that a convention 
so called would have original and final power itself to adopt, 
promulgate and declare effective the results of its labors with-
out submission to the whole people for their approval. 
K. Summary of Point II 
We summarize this point as follows: 
1. A constitution is a social compact among all the peo-
ple. I t is by its terms the supreme law of the state and there-
fore there can be no other law over it. I t is the delegation 
of sovereign power to agents who can take no action, except 
as specified therein, for its alteration or abolishment. Bind-
ing on both majority and minority, i t can be legally changed 
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only in accordance with its terms, except by a revolutionary 
process, peaceable or otherwise, for what lies outside the con-
stitutional provisions is no par t of the social compact, and 
there is no natural legal right that the majority can impose 
its will upon the minority. 
2. Article I, Section 1, is to be read in connection with 
Article XI I I , and the latter designates the explicit and au-
thentic act of the whole people necessary for amendment or 
revision. 
3. These principles are supported by the entire history 
of the Constitution: 
(a) I t is inconceivable that had the Convention 
method been intended, it would not have been specifically 
provided for. 
(b) The method now proposed has never been at-
tempted during the ninety-two years the Constitution 
has been in effect. 
(c) The constitutional method has been successfully 
used twenty-one times, and has also been followed in all 
cases where amendments were rejected. 
(d) The people have themselves construed the Con-
stitution upon the point by rejecting a proposal to 
amend it in such manner as to permit use of the conven-
tion method, both through the mode of a direct call by 
the Assembly, and that of submitting to the people the 
question of holding such a convention. 
(e) For over fifty years even the leaders of the op-
posing party have made no move and introduced no reso-
lution providing for the direct call of a convention by 
the General Assembly. 
(f) The people have acquiesced in the position which 
we now take. 
4. The foregoing principles are not affected by Section 10 
of Article IV for reasons both historic and logical, the legis-
lative power in question having been impliedly prohibited by 
the Constitution. 
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5. This position is supported by the authority of our own 
Supreme Court, of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, and 
other cases, and there are no judicial decisions holding the 
contrary. 
6. A constitutional prohibition can be implied as well as 
expressed, and is here necessarily implied. 
7. Precedents of a political, but not of a judicial, nature 
in other states are without judicial bearing. 
8. If, notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court should 
consider that the General Assembly has power to call a Con-
stitutional Convention, and should therefore answer Ques-
tion (a) in the affirmative, the answer should be clearly 
qualified so as to make it certain that no amendment or new 
constitution can become effective unless approved by the 
whole body of the people through their vote thereon upon the 
legal submission thereof to them for that purpose. 
9. The answer to Question (a) should therefore be in the 
negative. 
III. THE QUESTION OF THE LEGAL RIGHT OF THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO SUBMIT TO THE PEO-
PLE THE QUESTION, WHETHER A CONSTITU-
TIONAL CONVENTION SHOULD BE CALLED, IS 
NOT NOW BEFORE THE COURT. 
I t seems to us to be clear that as Question (a) asks whether 
the General Assembly may provide by law for a Convention 
to be called it cannot be interpreted to inquire whether the 
Assembly can submit to the people the question whether a 
Convention can be called, and we therefore do not go into 
this question at length, as it is not now before the Court for 
inquiry. I t is perhaps proper to state, however, that should 
the Court be of the opinion that this question is within the 
scope of its investigations, we are just as clearly of the opin-
ion that that question should also be answered in the nega-
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tive, and we submit that the arguments and authorities above 
referred to will equally well serve to demonstrate the legal 
impropriety of proceeding in that manner under our Consti-
tution. 
IV. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE QUESTIONS. 
If the Justices—notwithstanding the current of authority 
—should say that it is not necessary for the Assembly to ask 
"the people" if they want a convention then, at least, the Jus-
tices should make it plain and unmistakable just what ques-
tion or questions they are answering—that is to say does the 
communication from the Governor involve one question, with 
related and interdependent component parts so that an af-
firmative answer would mean that no constitutional change 
proposed by a convention can become effective, whatever 
other of the specific provisions may be included in an Act, 
unless a provision for submission to "the people" shall be in-
cluded and until a submission to "the people" shall have been 
made and their approval expressed, or 
does the communication from the Governor involve several 
distinct and separate questions so that affirmative answers 
would mean that an act which provided for one or more, but 
not all, of the specified provisions might lead to the promul-
gation of constitutional changes without previous reference 
to and approval by "the people." 
In order that it may be unequivocally established just what 
the Governor's communication means and what the answer 
of the Justices may signify it is necessary that the Justices 
should be asked this question— 
Does the Governor's communication mean that he asks, 
and will your opinion mean that you answer the following 
comprehensive question, or does that communication mean 
that the Governor asks and that your answers will mean that 
you answer several questions which are not necessarily re-
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lated and interdependent and that it will not be necessary 
for the Assembly, to include in an act a provision that any 
constitutional change which may be proposed by a Conven-
tion must be submitted to and approved by "the people" be-
fore the same becomes effective? 
Therefore it is necessary that this Court should announce 
whether the following is a correct expression of the true 
import and meaning of the Governor's inquiry— 
Would it be a valid exercise of the legislative power if the 
General Assembly should provide by law— 
for a convention to be called to propose a revision of or 
amendments to the Constitution of the State; 
for the Governor to call for the election, at a date to be 
fixed by him, of delegates to such convention in such num-
ber and manner as the General Assembly shall determine; 
for the inclusion of the General Officers of the State in 
the membership of such convention by virtue of their offices; 
for the organization and conduct of such convention; 
for the submission to the people, for their ratification and 
adoption or rejection, of any constitution or amendments 
proposed by such convention; and 
for declaring the result and effect of the vote of the 
electors voting upon the questions of such ratification and 
adoption or rejection; 
if such law shall contain the provision that no revision 
of said constitution or amendments thereto which shall be 
proposed by such convention shall become effective unless 
the same shall have been first submitted to the people as 
aforesaid and unless a majority of the electors voting there-
on shall have voted ratification and approval thereof? 
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V. QUESTIONS (b) , ( c ) , (d) , ( e ) , AND ( f ) SHOULD 
BE ANSWERED IN THE NEGATIVE. 
I t is quite plain that if we are correct in the position that 
Question (a) should be answered in the negative, each of 
the other questions must also be answered negatively. These 
latter questions all proceed upon the primary premise that 
a convention is to be called by the General Assembly, and 
upon that assumption inquire as to whether various steps 
and methods can be taken and employed with respect to its 
calling, organization, personnel, conduct, submission to the 
people of proposals, and declaration of result and effect. 
For example, Question (b) inquires relative to method of 
election of delegates "to such Convention"; (c) relative to 
the legality of the appointment by the Legislature of certain 
members "of such Convention"; (d) relative to the organiza-
tion of "such Convention"; (e) relative to the submission 
to the people of any Constitution proposed by "such Con-
vention"; and ( f ) relative to the method of declaring the 
result and effect of the vote upon "such ratification and 
adoption". The point need not be labored. We see no 
escape from the obvious conclusion that if the answer to 
Question (a) is, "No," the answer to the remaining ques-
tions is also negative. 
VI. ASSUMING, FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT 
ONLY, THAT QUESTION (a) , WITH PROPER 
QUALIFICATIONS, BE ANSWERED AFFIRMA-
TIVELY, QUESTION (b) SHOULD THEN BE 
ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE WITH CER-
TAIN QUALIFICATIONS. 
I t is necessary, however, for the sake of the argument, to 
assume (without for a moment conceding) that this Court 
may not find itself in agreement with our position under 
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Question ( a ) ; and upon that assumption it is proper to 
advert in detail to the remaining questions. 
As to Question (b) : Assuming that this Court should 
rule that the General Assembly may validly provide by law 
for a Convention to be called to revise or amend the Con-
stitution, it is our position that Question (b) still cannot 
be answered in the affirmative without some qualification. 
As we see it, the General Assembly would then be proceed-
ing upon an extra-legal basis and would be acting, according 
to Mr. Jameson and some other text-writers, as the delegated 
agents of the people to provide for the calling of a conven-
tion. For that purpose, as we understand the procedure in 
such anomalous instances, the delegation is to the General 
Assembly and not to the executive, and our view would be 
that the General Assembly, and not the Governor, should 
call for the election of delegates and should fix the date for 
the holding of such convention. We further presume that 
in such event it would be competent for the General As-
sembly to designate the number of delegates and the man-
ner of their election, subject to the important proviso that 
the manner of their election and their qualifications, and 
the number apportioned to the various districts in the state, 
should be so arranged as to provide a body truly representa-
tive of the whole people. 
VII. QUESTION (c) SHOULD BE ANSWERED 
IN THE NEGATIVE. 
Question (c) : This question inquires whether the As-
sembly can validly provide "that the General Officers of the 
State shall by virtue of their offices be members of such Con-
vention?" 
As to the proper answer to be given to this question, we 
believe there cannot be the slightest doubt. I t should clear-
ly be answered in the negative. 
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Discussing this matter, as we must at this point, upon 
the theory of those who have always maintained the pro-
priety of calling a Constitutional Convention, even those 
persons have never, so fa r as we are aware, claimed tha t the 
General Assembly could pack the Convention with its own 
nominees. That would be especially unfair where all of 
the Assembly's delegates are members of a single political 
party. 
By hypothesis, and under any sensible interpretation of 
Section 1 of Article I, even if the same be applicable in this 
situation, the only theory upon which the delegates can be 
chosen is that they are the representatives of the whole 
people. Their selection is at best extra-legal and extra-
constitutional—they would attend solely because they had 
been delegated as representatives of the people, with au-
thority to act only upon the precise question before the Con-
vention, i. e., the framing of an amendment to the Con-
stitution. 
But the general officers of the state—the Governor, Lieu-
tenant-Governor, Secretary of State, General Treasurer, 
and Attorney-General, are neither extra-legal nor extra-
constitutional. They are officers appointed under and not 
outside of the Constitution, and their powers and duties are 
clearly defined. Those powers and duties in no case can, 
by any stretch of the imagination, or of judicial interpreta-
tion, be considered to extend to acting as delegates of the 
whole people in the deliberations of a Constitutional Con-
vention. 
The only possible argument which occurs to us which 
might be proffered in opposition to our contention is that, 
since the general officers are elected by popular vote, they 
are therefore representatives of the whole people. The 
argument is specious. True, they have been elected by the 
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franchise of the people, but they have been elected under the 
Constitution, with power to do those things and those only 
which fall within the constitutional definitions of, and 
limitations upon, their department and powers. All are un-
questionably members of the Executive Department, and the 
powers and duties of that Department cannot trench upon 
either the legislative or the judicial departments; nor, a 
fortiori, upon an outside sovereign power. 
Taylor vs. Place, 4 R. I. 324. 
I t is submitted that while the nature of the powers of a 
Constitutional Convention is difficult to define (under the 
cases), it can truly be said that the purpose of such a Con-
vention is the draft ing and recommendation of a Constitu-
tion or of amendments thereto; and that being the case, it 
appears a fair corollary that its labors are in their nature 
rather legislative than executive or judicial. 
Looking at the matter a little more broadly, however, if 
the Legislature can appoint five delegates, why not ten? 
And if ten, why not fifty? Once establish the principle that 
delegates to a Constitutional Convention can be directly ap-
pointed by the Legislature, then, on principle, there is no 
stopping short of its power to appoint all the delegates, or 
to declare itself to be a Constitutional Convention, and there-
upon to submit a new Constitution to the people at any 
time at its own pleasure. 
That, however, has been held to be unlawful and uncon-
stitutional in a case often cited by our opponents, namely, 
Ellingham vs. Dye, 178 Ind. 336-443 (1012). 
In that case the Legislature assumed itself to frame a new 
Constitution for the people, and to submit it to them for 
adoption without the intervention of a Constitutional Con-
vention. I t was held that the Legislature had no power to 
propose a new Constitution other than in the specified mode 
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prescribed therein, and that the Secretary of State and other 
officials would be enjoined from preparing ballots and per-
forming other acts with reference to submitting the pro-
posed new Constitution to the people. 
In Baker vs. Moorhead, 174 N. W. 430 (Nebraska, 1919), 
the Court said: 
"The enactment is to be construed as mandatory, so 
that a statute, allowing the Governor to appoint mem-
bers of the convention, or providing that they shall be 
chosen by the Legislature itself, or in any manner other 
than by ballot at a free election by all qualified voters 
of the state, would be unconstitutional" 
And see Livermore vs. Waite, 102 Cal. 113 (1894). 
Even Jameson, the text-writer most often cited against 
our main position, has nothing but criticism for the theory 
that the Assembly may itself appoint delegates. In his book 
on "CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS", 4th Edition, he points 
out that Georgia is the only state in which that method was 
tried (in 1788—just af ter the Revolutionary period). In 
that early instance the delegates were chosen directly by the 
Legislature and Mr. Jameson says: 
"The case of the Georgia convention of 1788 to which 
the delegates were chosen directly by the Legislature, 
it need not be said, was a violation of all principle, and 
as a precedent would be f raught with extreme danger. 
So universally has this action of the Georgia legisla-
ture been discountenanced that it has never been imi-
tated in that or any other state." 
He then distinguishes the action in Rhode Island, in which, 
in the adoption of our present Constitution, those who would 
be electors under the new Constitution, were allowed to vote, 
stating that it was— 
"clearly a wise exercise of its legislative discretion to 
extend the franchise to those citizens whose just dis-
content had lately precipitated them into a revolution." 
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Careful search has produced no judicial authority which 
so much as intimates the propriety of the election of dele-
gates to a Constitutional Convention by the Legislature, and 
we believe that no such authority can be found. It is con-
trary, therefore, alike to the provisions of Section 1 of Ar-
ticle I, to precedent, to legal decision, and to the most ele-
mentary principles of Constitutional government. We con-
fidently assert that whether or not Question (c) is to be ap-
proached singly or as a part of a general plan of procedure 
embracing all the questions, the answer to that question must 
be in the negative. 
VIII. UPON THE ASSUMPTIONS MADE UNDER VI 
QUESTIONS (d), (e) AND (f) SHOULD BE AN-
SWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, BUT WITH 
PROPER QUALIFICATIONS. 
The fourth question is as to the validity of the exercise of 
legislative power: 
" ( d ) For the organization and conduct of such con-
vention." 
Assuming the validity of "such a Convention" at all, rea-
son and authority suggest to us no objection to proper action 
by the General Assembly for its organization along the usual 
lines followed in such cases. 
The next question inquires as to the power of the Assembly 
to provide— 
"(e ) For the submission to the people for their rati-
fication and adoption of any constitutional amendments 
proposed by such Convention." 
Upon the same assumptions as before, and further assum-
ing that such a Convention can constitutionally be called by 
the Legislature, it appears proper, and indeed absolutely nec-
essary, on principle and authority, that the constitutional 
amendments framed by the Convention should be submitted 
to the people for their ratification, adoption or rejection. As 
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rejection is not mentioned in the question, perhaps the Court, 
in answering that question (if it should be answered affirma-
tively) should qualify their answer in that particular. 
The last question inquired as to the power of the General 
Assembly to provide by law— 
" ( f ) For declaring the result and effect of the vote 
of a majority of the electors voting upon the question 
of such ratification and adoption?" 
The meaning of the question is not as clear as could be 
wished. We are uncertain what meaning is intended by the 
words, "declaring the result and effect of the vote of a ma-
jority of the electors". Our position is, and must remain, 
flatly, that under our Constitution changes can be constitu-
tionally and legally made only by a three-fifths vote of the 
whole people and in the mode prescribed in Article X I I I . If 
it is ruled otherwise, and we are proceeding, not under Ar-
ticle X I I I but in the extra-legal method, is the three-fifths 
vote of the people still required to adopt? Our own view 
would be, Yes—that the Constitution plainly contemplates 
that it is not to be changed except by the indicated propor-
tion of electors, and that it is not competent for the General 
Assembly to declare that any other or smaller proportion, 
can, consistently with the Constitution, make such changes. 
If Question (f) were answered in the affirmative, without 
qualification, the Assembly might consider i t competent to 
declare any one of the following results to be in effect: 
(a) that a vote of the majority, but less than three-
fifths, resulted in the adoption of the new Constitution; 
(b) that the same vote did not result in the adoption 
of a new Constitution; 
(c) that a three-fifths' majority either did or did not 
so result; 
(d) that the entire vote was without effect. 
All of these results are strictly and logically possible under 
the rather loose wording of Question ( f ) . We submit that 
447 
while, broadly speaking, the question may (without conced-
ing our general contention) be decided by this Court to call 
for an affirmative answer, any such answer should contain 
rigid qualifications making it clear that any action by the 
General Assembly along the lines contemplated would not 
be a valid exercise of the legislative power unless it truly re-
flected and confirmed the action of the electors, whether a ma-
jority or three-fifths, as the Court may decide to be the Con-
stitutional proportion required. 
IX. CONCLUSION. 
In conclusion, we reiterate our settled and sincere belief 
that all of the questions ought to be answered in the negative, 
and that only in that way will or can the true meaning of our 
Constitution be definitely and finally established. A mode 
of amendment is prescribed, no crisis impends, no revolution 
—even a peaceful or quasi-legal one—is necessary. If changes 
are required, they can be made in the future as they have 
been in the past in the Constitutional mode. Nothing more 
certainly establishes the respect of the people for, and their 
reliance upon the opinions of, the judiciary than its accept-
ance of the guidance of long-settled precedent, usage and au-
thority. The alternative, as we have pointed out, is not final 
settlement, but the certainty of continued doubt and agita-
tion as to the true interpretation of our supreme law. 
We have found no expression better representing our feel-
ings in the matter than the remarks of counsel in Ekern vs. 
McGovern, 142 N. W. Rep. (1913), at page 611, quoted by 
Marshall, J., as follows: "When discontent, violence and an-
archy shall succeed to law and order,—when the people and 
public officers shall depart from the Constitution and desert 
the ship of state, I have a hope that the last glimpses that 
will be caught of organized government will be the judiciary, 
—that courts may be here as long as any vestige of a state 
448 
shall remain; still ready to direct, — still speaking the law 
with an even mind, dispensing justice with an even hand, sit-
ting serene and unmoved above the influence of fear and fac-
tion, still abiding by the motto so peculiarly their own,—'Fiat 
justitia, ruat coelnm 
Respectfully submitted, 
FREDERICK W . TILLINGHAST, 
E L M E R S . CHACE, 
Amici Curiae. 
R E Q U E S T I O N S S U B M I T T E D B Y H I S 
E X C E L L E N C Y T H E G O V E R N O R T O 
T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T F O R I T S 
O P I N I O N I N A N S W E R T O C E R -
T A I N Q U E S T I O N S C O N C E R N I N G 
A C O N S T I T U T I O N A L C O N V E N T I O N 
Brief of Russell W. Richmond, Esq. 
In Support of a Negative Answer 
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Re Questions Submitted By His Excellency the Governor 
to the Supreme Court for Its Opinion in Answer to 
Certain Questions Concerning a Constitutional Con-
vention. 
STATEMENT 
The Questions submitted by His Excellency the Governor 
are as follows. 
"Would it be a valid exercise of the legislative power if the 
General Assembly should provide by law 
" ( a ) for a convention to be called to revise or amend the 
Constitution of the State; 
" (b ) that the Governor shall call for the election, at a 
date to be fixed by him, of delegates to such convention in 
such number and manner as the General Assembly shall de-
termine ; 
" (c ) that the General Officers of the State shall by virtue 
of their offices be members of such convention; 
" (d ) for the organization and conduct of such conven-
tion ; 
" (e ) for the submission to the people, for their ratifica-
tion and adoption, of any constitution or amendments pro-
posed by such convention; and 
" ( f ) for declaring the result and effect of the vote of a 
majority of the electors voting upon the question of such 
ratification and adoption?" 
QUESTION 
In this argument I propose to discuss from the legal stand-
point only the questions, namely, 
Can the General Assembly by legislative act validly—that 
is constitutionally—call a constitutional convention, super-
vise its organization and give validity to its findings on ap-
proval by a majority vote of the electors of the state. 
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POINT 
THE CONSTITUTION OF RHODE ISLAND CAN BE 
LAWFULLY AMENDED OR CHANGED ONLY IN 
THE MODE WHICH ITSELF PRESCRIBES. 
Article X I I I entitled "Of Amendments" sets forth the one 
method in clear language and with great detail. No men-
tion of a constitutional convention is made in this or any-
other article of the constitution. 
The statement of law involved in this question and which 
I have herein set forth is contained in a former advisory opin-
ion of this court rendered in 1883. 
In re Constitutional Convention 14 R. I. 649. 
While it is true that such an opinion has not the binding 
effect of a decision (Taylor vs. Place, 4 R. I. 324) yet it is 
entitled to great weight in view of the cogency of its reason-
ing and the further fact that it enunciates and establishes 
a well settled principle of law which many courts and text-
writers have adopted in construing the power of legisla-
tures to change or alter or amend a constitution. 
This principle is stated as follows: 
W H E R E A CONSTITUTION P R E S C R I B E D T H E 
METHOD BY WHICH IT MAY BE AMENDED SUCH 
CONSTITUTION MAY BE CHANGED ONLY BY THE 
METHOD PRESCRIBED. 
Switzer vs. State, 103 Ohio State 306, 316; 
Johnson vs. Craft, 205 Ala. 385; 
Oakland Paving Co. vs. Hilton, 69 Cal. 479; 
Livermore vs. Wait, 102 Cal. 113; 
Koehler vs. Hill, 60 la. 543; 
State vs. Marcus, 160 Wis. 354; 
Wells vs. Bain, 75 Pa. 39; 
6 R. C. L. 31 Par. I l l and cases cited; 
12 C. J . 682. 
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The reasons for reaching the above sound conclusions 
seem to be three in number. 
(1) The amending article prescribes and defines the 
course to be pursued in the exercise of the sovereign's right 
to alter and change its constitution. 
The very term constitution implies an instrument of a 
permanent and abiding nature whence the provisions therein 
for revision implies the will of the people that the underly-
ing principles shall be of a like permanent and abiding na-
ture. Therefore, the amending provisions in a constitution 
prescribe and define the course to be pursued in the exer-
cise of the inherent power of the people to alter and change 
their basic law. 
Livermore vs. Wait, supra; 
Switzer vs. State, supra; 
Johnson vs. Craft, supra; 
Erwin vs. Nolan, 280 Mo. 401, 407. 
(2) The power to propose amendments is not legislation. 
State vs. Marcus, supra; 
Hollingsworth vs. Virginia, 3 Dall (U. S.) 378; 
Oakland Paving Co. vs. Hilton, supra. 
(3) The constitution expressing one thing in the sense of 
specifying excludes things not expressed. 
In re Constitutional Convention, 14 R. I. 649. 
Applying the foregoing principles and reasoning to Rhode 
Island's constitution, we can only reach the following con-
clusions. 
1. All sovereignty is vested in the whole people of the 
state. R. I. Constitution Article 1, Sec. 1. 
2. The present constitution is the will of the sovereign 
in Rhode Island. Every word of it is the sovereign will, and 
it is the sole knowledge we have of the sovereign will. 
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3. This constitution "till changed by an explicit and au-
thentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon 
all." 
4. The sovereign will has restricted the General Assem-
bly in remaking, altering, or amending the constitution to 
the one, sole, and only method prescribed in Article X I I I . 
5. I t is the sovereign will not to be invoked in any other 
manner. 
6. The questions submitted by the Governor must all be 
answered in the negative. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the General Assembly would not be acting under 
its legislative power, is limited in the exercise of its amend-
ing power to the method prescribed, and can not delegate 
any of its powers to the Governor or any other person, it can 
not, in the valid exercise of any power it has, expressed or 
implied in the constitution, provide by law or legislative 
enactment, for a convention to be called to revise or amend 
the Constitution of the State, or for other details concerning 
such a convention and its organization, functions, powers, 
etc., as set forth in His Excellency's Questions. Hence, these 
questions should all be answered in the negative. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RUSSELL W . RICHMOND. 
State of Rhode Island Providence, Sr. 
Supreme Court 
Re: GOVERNOR'S REQUEST FOR OPINION OF 
THE SUPREME COURT ON CERTAIN QUES-
TIONS RELATIVE TO AMENDMENT OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 
BRIEF OF ZECHARIAH CHAFEE 
IN SUPPORT OF THE NEGATIVE SIDE 
State of Rhode Island 
Providence, Sr. Supreme Court 
Re: Governor's Request for Opinion of the Supreme Court 
on Certain Questions Relative to Amendment of the 
Constitution. 
B R I E F OF ZECHARIAH CHAFEE 
IN SUPPORT OF THE NEGATIVE SIDE 
Replying to a request that briefs be submitted to the Court 
by others than members of the Bar, I respectfully present 
the following brief: 
The questions submitted by the Governor to the Court 
are interesting. Their immediate purport is somewhat start-
ling, and this is the point to which I would especially ask 
the attention of the Court: 
The questions submitted by the Governor are the follow-
ing: 
"Would it be a valid exercise of the legislative power 
if the General Assembly should provide by law 
" ( a ) for a convention to be called to revise or amend 
the Constitution of the State; 
" (b ) that the Governor shall call for the election at 
a date to be fixed by him, of delegates to such 
convention in such manner and number as the 
General Assembly may determine; 
" (c ) that the General officers of the State shall by 
virtue of their offices be members of such con-
vention ; 
" ( d ) for the organization and conduct of such con-
vention ; 
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"(e) for the submission to the people, for their rati-
fication and adoption, of any Constitution or 
amendments proposed by such convention; and 
" ( f ) for declaring the result and effect of the vote 
of a majority of the electors voting upon the 
question of such ratification and adoption?" 
OUTLINE OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Question ( f ) should be answered in the negative 
POINT II 
Question (c) should be answered in the negative 
POINT III 
Question (d) should be answered in the negative 
POINT IV 
A Convention should not be called. There is no urgent 
necessity or preponderant public opinion calling therefor. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Question ( f ) should be answered in the negative 
The policy underlying the questions is that the Consti-
tution be reshaped and rewritten, not solely by a Constitu-
tional Convention, but to a very considerable extent by the 
Legislature itself in advance of a Constitutional Conven-
tion. 
Let us look a t Question ( f ) for example. 
Article X I I I of the Constitution says tha t approval of 
amendments by the people shall be by 3/5ths of the elec-
tors of the State present and voting in Town and Ward 
meetings. Question (f) contemplates that such approval 
shall be by a bare majority of the people. Such a change is, 
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in my judgment, unconstitutional and an impairment of a 
safeguard to which I have been accustomed as against hasty 
legislation. 
Under cover of a Constitutional Convention other pro-
posed amendments by the Legislature in advance of a con-
stitutional Convention come to mind. The work of a Con-
stitutional Convention, if held under this plan, would be 
written in advance by the Assembly to a very considerable 
extent. 
Such a procedure for amending the Constitution I do not 
think is anywhere contemplated in the Constitution. 
POINT II 
Question (c) should be answered in the negative 
Question (c) contemplates a procedure which is some-
what lacking in its appeal to common sense. Administrative 
Officers are not ex-officio members of a legislative body or 
of a body to which legislative prerogatives have been dele-
gated. The Legislature cannot make the Governor or others 
members of the Legislature. That comes through vote of 
the people. If the Governor and others wish to be members 
of a body exercising legislative functions the proper course 
is for them to present themselves as individuals to the 
electors and stand or fall by the judgment of the electors as 
to their suitability for any desired position. The Legisla-
ture is going beyond its function when it proposes to stack 
the cards as to membership in a Convention ostensibly to be 
filled by candidates selected from and by the people. 
POINT III 
Question (d) should be answered in the negative 
Question (d) conferring upon the Legislature power to 
arrange for the organization and conduct of a Constitu-
tional Convention opens the door for rewriting the Consti-
tution in advance in many particulars by the Legislature. 
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POINT IV 
A Convention should not be called. There is no urgent 
necessity or preponderant public opinion calling therefor. 
We have been repeatedly told that the divergence from 
Article X I I I and the calling of the Constitutional Conven-
tion was justified by the fact that there is an overwhelming-
public sentiment in favor of a change in our Constitution, 
and that this sentiment cannot have effect while our Legis-
lature is as a t present constituted. This statement, it should 
be noted, is not correct. Question (f) submitted by the Gov-
ernor to this Court is enlightening in this connection. I t 
discloses the fact that in the Governor's judgment there is 
not an overwhelming desire for the changes which he ex-
pects to be presented to the people. He reduces the popular 
vote necessary for confirmation from 3/5ths to a bare ma-
jority. The desire for haste on the par t of the Governor and 
his associates fur ther shows his lack of confidence in a 
persistent and continuing public sentiment which would 
retain in a coming legislature the present preponderance 
of votes for the desired changes. 
Haste to seize a special opportunity, and narrow margins 
in popular vote for adoption, are not consistent with the 
tenor of our Constitution, with Article X I I I or for the 
good of the State as a whole. 
Nor is it correct to say that our Constitution cannot be 
amended as it now stands. Such a statement is contrary to 
experience. I t has been amended many times within my 
own experience. The arguments now adduced have been 
adduced many times and shown by time to be unjustifiable. 
I recall what was said about the Bourne amendment and 
about Women's Suffrage. 
Amendments have come in response to definite and per-
manent phases of opinions. The process is perfectly natural 
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and inevitable when the preponderance of our people have 
certain convictions and continue to hold them. There is a 
weight of public opinion which invariably produces the 
votes necessary for the amendments in the Legislatures and 
in popular elections. At the moment adequate popular sen-
timent is lacking for the desired changes. 
Having been brought up in Rhode Island I have a respect 
for the authors of the Constitution and for those who gave 
their approval to this document. I believe these gentlemen 
knew what they wanted to say and said it plainly and not 
by implication. Article XI I I , to my mind, was made to 
stand and does stand until changed as therein provided. 
The Legislature cannot delegate to any Assembly privi-
leges which it does not itself possess. I t cannot exclude from 
any Assembly any of the obligations by which it is itself 
restricted. I t cannot by itself amend the Constitution. 
Article IX also, I believe, was made to stand and does 
stand. Article IX and Article X I I I to my mind are not dis-
united. I quote them as important considerations now before 
the people and before the Court. I ask adherence to them, and 
certainly there is no necessity or overwhelming popular sen-
timent which justifies the lessening of any of the safeguards 
customarily attending amendments of the Constitution. 
Article IX, Sections 3 and 4 of the Constitution of Rhode 
Island reads as follows: 
Sec. 3. All general officers shall take the following 
engagement before they act in their respective offices, to 
wit ; You being by the free vote of the 
electors of this State of Rhode Island and Providence 
Plantations, elected unto the place of do 
solemnly swear (or affirm) to be true and faithful unto 
this state, and to support the constitution of this state 
and of the United States; that you will faithfully and 
impartially discharge all the duties of your aforesaid 
office to the best of your abilities, according to law: So 
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help you God. Or, this affirmation you make and give 
upon the peril of the penalty of perjury. 
Sec. 4. The members of the general assembly, the 
judges of all the courts, and all other officers, both civil 
and military, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to 
support this constitution, and the constitution of the 
United States. 
Article X I I I reads as follows: 
The general assembly may propose amendments to 
this constitution by the votes of a majority of all the 
members elected to each house. Such propositions for 
amendments shall be published in the newspapers, and 
printed copies of them shall be sent by the secretary of 
state, with the names of all the members who shall have 
voted thereon, with the yeas and nays, to all the town 
and city clerks in the state. The said propositions shall 
be, by said clerks, inserted in the warrants or notices by 
them issued, for warning the next annual town and 
ward meetings in Apri l ; and the clerks shall read said 
propositions to the electors when thus assembled, with 
the names of all the representatives and senators who 
shall have voted thereon, with the yeas and nays, before 
the election of senators and representatives shall be had. 
If a majority of all the members elected to each house, 
at said annual meeting, shall approve any proposition 
thus made, the same shall be published and submitted 
to the electors in the mode provided in the act of ap-
proval ; and if then approved by three-fifths of the elec-
tors of the state present and voting thereon in town and 
ward meetings, it shall become a par t of the constitu-
tion of the state. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ZECHARIAH C H A F E E , 
5 Cooke Street, 
Providence, Rhode Island. 
